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PREFACE 
 
 
The Glucksman Institute for Research in Securities Markets awards fellowships each year 
to outstanding second year Stern MBA students to work on independent research projects 
under a faculty member's supervision. Two research projects completed by the 
Glucksman Fellows of 2007-2008 are included in this special issue of the Finance 
Department Working Paper Series. These papers focus on important topics in empirical 
financial economics.  
Josh Zacharias, under the supervision of David Backus, explores the relationship between 
efficiency and size in microfinance institutions. In particular, the paper finds strong 
evidence of scale efficiencies in microfinance institutions.  Mark Faktorovich, under the 
direction of Yakov Amihud, examines the level of success of a cross-border acquisition 
strategy. Specifically, this paper identifies differences in performance of U.S. companies 
that completed a cross-border acquisition compared with U.S. companies that acquired 
domestic targets. These papers, reflecting the research effort of two outstanding Stern 
MBA students, are summarized in more detail in the Table of Contents on the next page. 
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seeking enterprise of credit loans and the social effort to improve living conditions of the 
poor.  However, in order for these two goals to coexist, there must be some ability for 
firms to grow efficiently. Comparing like firms as well as looking at growth trends over 
time, we find that there is strong evidence of scale efficiencies in microfinance 
institutions. We conclude with a discussion of the nature of the economies of scale and 
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I. Introduction 
The business of microfinance strikes a delicate balance between the profit-seeking 
enterprise of credit loans and the social effort to improve the living conditions of the rural and 
urban poor. Envisioned by Muhammad Yunus in Bangladesh in 1976, microfinance was initially 
an attempt to design “a credit delivery system to provide banking services targeted at the rural 
poor,” one predicated on “removing the need for collateral and [creating] a banking system based 
on mutual trust, accountability, participation and creativity.”1 Microfinance took root with the 
work of Yunus, who won the 2006 Nobel Peace Prize, and has continued with the worldwide 
creation and expansion of microfinance institutes (MFIs). Since Yunus established the Grameen 
Bank in 1983, microfinance has grown from a simple “credit delivery system” into a vast 
network of institutions, with diverse locations, structures and even diverse mission statements. 
With this rapid growth and diversity has emerged a philosophical dilemma. Where once 
the foundation of microfinance fell clearly on the social side as a tool to combat poverty through 
the empowerment of impoverished entrepreneurs, there is now a significant number of people 
viewing the practice as a self-sustaining, commercial enterprise.  This is best exemplified by 
Compartamos in Mexico which has built a $400 million loan portfolio, makes $80 million in 
profits and went public in 2007. This latter decision has been questioned by Yunus who believes 
Compartamos’ decision will lead to the abandonment of microfinance’s social mission.2
Furthermore, microfinance has significant attraction to the for-profit world, albeit an 
attraction rife with paradox.  For one, despite the removal of collateral and credit history as a 
loan prerequisite, MFIs have been shown to have an extremely small loan default rate, 
                                                 
1 Grameen Bank online, http://www.grameen-info.org/bank/ 
2 Malkin (2008) 
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comparable to or even lower than their commercial counterparts.3  Second, despite most 
traditional support coming from non-governmental organizations and socially-oriented 
investors4, Krauss and Walter (2006) show that MFIs generally show very low exposure to 
market movements, making them a potentially intriguing risk-reducing portfolio diversification 
option for investors. 
Amidst this discussion, a key issue has only begun to be examined and thus far has been 
left largely unresolved, namely the scalability of the microfinance process.  At the base of any 
commercialization effort is the implicit idea that an MFI could grow to disperse enough small 
loans that it could make up for a loan-size disadvantage with sheer quantity and high repayment 
rates.  This would allow the MFI to eventually reach self-sufficiency and sustainability as profit-
making ventures while continuing to satisfy their socially-oriented mission. 
This paper seeks to address two questions within this area: first, what cost efficiencies are 
evident in microfinance with regard to firm size when comparing like firms? And second, what 
observable patterns are seen when viewing individual firm growth longitudinally, and do these 
patterns suggest the existence of economies of scale?  We begin with a discussion of the small 
but growing body of work in the area of microfinance efficiency, as we seek to understand the 
most appropriate measures of efficiency in this unique area of banking.  We will then examine a 
broad sample of MFIs using an analysis of covariance regression model with proxies for various 
firm attributes.  This will allow us to understand the impact of size across similar firms.  In order 
to understand scale efficiencies in firms as MFIs grow, we also devise a multivariate approach to 
consider matched pairs of portfolio growth and operational cost growth for a broad sample of 
MFIs.  In both analyses, we find strong evidence of scale efficiencies across firms and we break 
                                                 
3 Various research papers report a repayment rate over 95% for many MFIs, including Morduch (2000). 
4 Morduch (2000) reports that experts believe only 1% of all NGO-sponsored MFIs are self-sufficient and predict 
that no more than 5% would ever be. 
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this efficiency into various dimensions including firm region, firm type and firm self-sufficiency. 
We finish with a discussion of the findings as well as identifying other areas for future 
investigation. 
 
II. Scale Efficiency in Financial Institutions 
Investigation into efficiency in commercial financial institutions has a rich background, 
including a robust subcategory of papers specifically addressing scale efficiencies. Beginning as 
early as the 1960s, including a study of economies of scale in branch banking by Benston (1965) 
and continuing with a broad range of international data sets today, these studies have yielded 
both important specific findings as well as varied general approaches to understanding the 
relationship between inputs and outputs of financial firms.  However, with a multitude of 
methodologies, several questions emerge with regard to microfinance: what are the challenges to 
identifying inefficiency versus noise? Moreover, even after identifying inefficiency, how can one 
best sort out the source?  And of course, what is the best approach to overcome these issues? 
For the last quarter century, Allen N. Berger and David B. Humphrey have played a 
particularly large role in this field, having outlined the idea of X-inefficiency in the early 1990s 
as well as making significant methodological advances in numerous other papers. In fact, their 
research has in many ways mirrored the field at large, as studies initially emphasized scale and 
scope efficiencies and more recently shifted to distinguishing X-inefficiency from the other two 
forms.  Fittingly, the two paired up to conduct a broad survey, Berger and Humphrey (1997), 
where they parse out different measurement methodologies that have been used in frontier 
analysis, including both parametric and non-parametric approaches. Along with Berger and 
Mester (1997), the authors conclude that the assumptions and measurement techniques can make 
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a difference in the conclusions of the source of inefficiency; however, “the choice made 
concerning measurement technique, functional form, and other variables usually make very little 
difference in terms of either industry average or the rankings of individual firms.”5
That said, Humphrey (1987) and Yuengert (1993) present related approaches that have 
particular appeal to the task of investigating sources of inefficiency in microfinance as an 
industry.  In both papers, the author shows that the sample of financial institutions can be divided 
into quartiles by asset size to reveal not only an impact on the average cost of operations as size 
changes but also on the magnitude of the variation of the costs.  Though Humphrey used this 
primarily to illuminate the differences between similar-sized firms, Yuengert goes on to compare 
different approaches, specifically a Weighted Least Squares (WLS) approach and a Thick 
Frontier Analysis (TFA), and ultimately devises a method of measurement that allows the 
variance of the distributions themselves to vary with firm size. 
This has immediate suggestions for an approach to MFIs, because our group of MFIs has 
a similar general distribution to both of the aforementioned samples.  In short, a quick look at 
Figure 1 confirms that the average cost dispersion varies fairly significantly by firm size: 
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Fig. 1 - Average Operating Cost vs. Gross Loan Portfolio for Microfinance Institutions
Data Source: Microfinance Information eXchange
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5 Berger and Mester (1997), p. 42 
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 Before conducting any in-depth analysis, we can perhaps already observe a general 
downward trend to the data suggesting the presence of scale efficiencies.  However, the more 
striking pattern is the difference in variation, with the cluster of points on the low end of the size 
spectrum ranging much wider than the cluster on the high end.  Thus our distribution is 
remarkably similar to the life insurance companies examined by Yuengert (1993) and the banks 
looked at by Humphrey (1987), and a version of their approach seems appropriate.  We will take 
up this discussion later on as we walk through the methodology of this study. 
 
III. Related Studies on Microfinance Institutions 
Relative to other financial institutions, the microfinance industry and MFIs offer a much 
younger body of research, but with a recent explosion of studies and journal articles in the area. 
For an excellent summary of the earlier portion of this work, including a broad categorization of 
different avenues of study in microfinance, see Brau and Woller (2004). 
Perhaps owing to the infancy of microfinance and thus the relative absence of reliable 
data, there is a clear bias in prior studies toward the economic theory and social implications.  
Morduch (2000) and Morduch (1999a) do an outstanding job presenting – and in some cases 
discrediting – some of the traditional propositions of microfinance.  In particular, Morduch 
(2000) focuses on the delicate balance between efficiency and depth of outreach on one side and 
sustainability on the other, showing how the perceived “win-win” microfinance ideal rests on 
shaky presumptions.  However, Murduch’s argument is mostly a semantic one, based more on 
general consensus and overall economic theory than on supporting data and research.  The 
reason for this is simple: few studies existed on microfinance operations and efficiency.  
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A number of researchers have leapt into that void since the publication of Morduch’s 
paper, with an effort to understand efficiencies and operational trends of microfinance firms, 
including Gutierrez-Nieto, et al. (2007), Cull, et al. (2007), and Nghiem (2003) among others.  
Reviewing the recent literature, three approaches seem to have emerged in parallel.  The first and 
probably most prolific is the case-based, anecdotal study. This has been and continues in some 
arena to be the preferred approach to microfinance analysis. Much within this body of work was 
surveyed by Brau and Woller (2004), and the problem with this approach remains the same: it is 
very difficult to extend to larger populations and thus merely serves to further the various policy 
and economic arguments surrounding the field. 
The second approach is through straightforward financial ratio comparisons.  Employed 
by Baumann (2004) as well as by The Microbanking Bulletin6, this benchmarking places a firm 
or a sample of firms in relation to a population – such as South Africa relative to the world in the 
case of Baumann’s study.  The main advantage of this technique is its ease and quickness.  With 
simple grouping and averaging, a firm or groups of firms can broadly evaluate its own 
performance and perhaps establish relativistic performance goals.  However, often the 
benchmarking is too simplistic and falls well short of informing policy or identifying the true 
magnitude and source of efficiencies and inefficiencies. 
Recently, there have been several sophisticated extensions to this approach – namely the 
integration of regression techniques as well as preliminary frontier analysis.  Traditionally, a lack 
of reliable data has hampered efforts to get meaningful regression results in the microfinance 
field, but the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX) has closed this gap significantly, 
making financial metrics readily accessible across a broad scope of microfinance firms.  Cull, et 
                                                 
6 The Microbanking Bulletin is a biannual publication put out by the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX). In 
each issue, it publishes “MIX Benchmarks” which allows individual firms to quickly place its performance in a 
number of categories in the broader context of its peer group. 
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al. (2007) appears to be the first in-depth study to use this data set, and the authors do an 
outstanding job answering three dimensions of questions, including the impact of interest rate 
level on MFI performance, the presence of “mission drift” away from the social effort and 
toward financial viability, and finally the trade-off between depth of outreach and the pursuit of 
profitability. 
The final approach to MFI analysis is a mirror of much current financial institution 
analysis: a frontier approach primarily through DEA.  This appears to have gained significant 
traction among researchers focusing their effort on categorizing firms in a sample in terms of 
specific operational characteristics and each firm’s relative efficiency in those areas.  Of course, 
the benefit of this approach as outlined by Berger and Humphrey (1997) is that it establishes far 
more robust benchmarks to identify “best practice” firms, mainly by understanding the 
relationships between a set of inputs and outputs. In particular, Gutierrez-Nieto, et al. (2007) 
used DEA to rank the relative efficiencies of a sample of Latin American MFIs in several 
different dimensions, and then continue on to use Principal Component Analysis (PCA) to 
understand the sources of variance in the global set. The result is four “principal components of 
efficiency”: an overall assessment of efficiency based on the DEA model, NGO status, efficiency 
approach based on loan officers or operational costs, and gross loan portfolio. The authors also 
make some broad hypotheses about the impact of country and NGO status on several measures 
of efficiency.  The drawback to any PCA analysis is that while the authors can make strong 
conjecture about the “meaning” of the components, the practical application of these vague. 
Overall, after years of lagging far behind the study of commercial financial institutions, 
there is a rapidly growing body of literature investigating microfinance efficiencies on which to 
build. Specifically, two studies – Cull, et al. (2007) and Gutierrez-Nieto, et al. (2007) – offer 
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both comparison points as well as methodological forerunners of this paper.  In particular, this 
paper will conduct a similar regression analysis to Cull, et al. (2007); however we will make 
three major additions: first, we will aim to refine the regression analysis to focus more on the 
operational metrics of MFIs (as opposed to the financial focus in Cull), specifically the 
relationship between operational cost and size.  Second, we will adopt a slightly different model, 
using a general linear analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) model with weighted least squares to 
account for the differences in the variance of MFIs within different asset classes (as seen in 
Figure 1 earlier). And finally, we will look at the data set over time, using paired sets of 
operational cost and portfolio size growth measurements to understand patterns as MFIs grow. 
The next section will discuss this choice of methodology at greater length. 
 
IV. Methodology 
This study uses two different measurement techniques on the same core set of data.  For 
the first portion of our study, we use an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA) general linear model 
with weighted least squares across a wide sample of MFIs.  This will allow us to include vital 
categorical predictors as well as firm attributes measured on a continuous scale. While Yuengert 
(1993) proposes to use a more complicated regression methodology with two error variables – 
one to control for X-inefficiency and one for noise – the results from Berger and Humphrey 
(1997) seem to bear out that for an industry overview the difference is minimal.  And while 
frontier analysis has been used by numerous financial institutional studies and several 
microfinance studies, as stated before, these approaches seem more appropriate in attempts to 
benchmark “best practice firms” through the identification of X-inefficiencies (such as DEA 
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analysis). However, by not including a noise variable, they seem to reduce the value of an 
industry overview. 
The second portion of the study looks at MFI growth over time.  The sample is a 
subsection of the firms above, namely the ones that have multiple years of operational and 
financial data.  The goal is to look at each firm’s growth on a one-year and five-year basis, while 
regressing normalized operational cost growth on one side against normalized gross loan 
portfolio growth on the other.  In mathematical terms (where g = growth, OC = Operating Costs 
and GLP = Gross Loan Portfolio): 
i
GLP
i
OC
i gg εββ ++= )(*10  
The results of this regression give us a sense of the relationship between cost growth and 
size growth, which is then broken down further by different dimensions. Specifically, if a firm 
sees no economies of scale, we expected the regression coefficient, β1, to be equal to 1.  That is, 
a one unit increase in Gross Loan Portfolio growth correlates to a one unit change in Operational 
Cost growth.  Anything significantly different from one informs us about scale efficiency: for 
β1<1, a one unit change in size correlates to a smaller change in costs which is the essence of 
economies of scale.  Again, we normalize the growth data thus eliminating the complications of 
negative growth in either operating costs or gross loan portfolio. 
Another appealing factor in this approach is that we implicitly control for many of the 
internal and external operational factors since we are basically comparing a firm to itself over 
time, thus much irregular variation can be attributed to noise and will be captured by our error 
term, ε.  Granted, there may be some systematic bias, but we attempt to account for this by 
looking at the growth relationship across different slices (most notably by age, region and type of 
firm), effectively controlling growth for various firm factors. Overall, we then relate the results 
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from the ANCOVA regression with what we see by looking at scale efficiencies in a different 
dimension (i.e. time) in order to further understand the major factors that play into efficiencies. 
 
V. Data Source 
All data for microfinance institutions was drawn from the 2006 financial data contained 
in the Microfinance Information eXchange (MIX), a “global information exchange for the 
microfinance industry [that] strives to facilitate exchange and investments flows, promote 
transparency and improve reporting standards in the microfinance industry.”7  A few words on 
the database: as of the writing of this paper, MIX makes basic financial reports available for 
1,158 MFIs from around the world, with 625 of these receiving a rating of four or five diamonds 
indicating that they have a minimum of two consecutive years of audited financial statements.  
This study only used this smaller group of 625 MFIs for issues of data completeness and 
reliability (i.e. for firms with a 3-diamond rating or lower, there were many key elements missing 
from their operational data thus making regression analysis impossible). 
For the longitudinal study, this data set was refined even further to include only firms 
with a 5-diamond rating.  Again, the rationale is simple: we needed firms with multiple years of 
financials and only 5-diamond firms qualified beyond two years.  This left the study with a set of 
248 firms to examine on a one-year growth basis, though only 100 of these have complete five-
year operational cost growth available. 
Like Cull, et al. (2007), this study is only possible due to the excellent work that MIX has 
done distilling financial statements from many MFIs into a core set of data markers.  That said, 
there are several bias factors that must be mentioned: first, there is obvious selection bias in our 
sample as only those firms that choose to report to MIX are used.  Furthermore, in selecting the 
                                                 
7 Microfinance Information eXchange at http://www.mixmarket.org/ 
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firms that have the best relationship with MIX – essentially the 4- and 5-diamond firms – we 
may be further biasing our results toward the healthier MFIs.  In particular, we might also expect 
some survivorship bias since firms that have since been removed from the higher diamond rating 
status, or removed from the database overall, will not be included in this study.  However, these 
sources of bias are more easily addressed than the traditional issue with microfinance studies: a 
lack of robust data to begin with.  Thus we do our best to account for the implications of bias in 
our discussion of the results. 
 
VI. Variable Selection 
For the most part, the Methodology section addresses how the longitudinal study was 
conducted. However, a few words must be said about the selection of variables in the ANOVA 
model. The first issue was to select proxies for operational efficiency.  One particular measure 
emerged as the best: Average Operating Cost (which equals operating expenses divided by gross 
loan portfolio).  Average Operating Cost has been used successfully in prior studies of financial 
institutions – for examples, see Yuengert (1993) and Gutierrez-Nieto, et al. (2007) – and are 
available in our data set.  Furthermore, Average Operating Cost will have to be converted to a 
logged scale, as the distribution is clearly logarithmic (see Appendix 1 for histogram). 
The second decision was to establish specific categories and/or proxy variables to include 
in the regression in order to account for the vast differences in MFIs.  In other words, what 
control dimensions are needed in order to distill the relationship between cost and size?  MIX 
offers a number of indicators; the goal was to find proxies for four core areas: size, profitability, 
region and type.  This was based on preliminary tests for significance as well as the PCA 
 12
analysis in Gutierrez-Nieto, et al. (2007) which found that size, type, and approach/mission were 
the key dimensions of their DEA analysis.  Thus the selected indicators are as follows: 
Size: To understand the relationship between the efficiency and scale of MFIs, this is 
obviously the most important category.  There are two dimensions that we include: Gross Loan 
Portfolio, and Average Loan Size. In the context of MFIs, the latter proxy is particularly 
interesting as loan size can be a very good indicator of the mission of various firms (with the 
assumption that smaller loans often indicate a dedication to the original goal of microfinance, 
namely targeting the very poor). Furthermore, the measure addresses the intuition that the 
number of borrowers and the overall gross loan portfolio are key drivers of operational costs.  
Thus taken together, we understand the two dimensions in which a microfinance firm might see 
economies of scale.  Both variables follow logarithmic distributions and are therefore logged 
throughout this study. 
Profitability: As with size, two proxies are used to account for variance in MFI 
profitability: Operational Self-Sufficiency (equal to Revenues/Expenses) and Return on Assets 
(ROA). This will control for firms of different profit classes.  In the commercial banking world, 
this would mean “financial health;” in the microfinance world, profitability may not always be 
the goal of the institution – particularly when one considers non-profits or NGOs – so we will 
talk in terms of mission as well as health. 
Region: This is a proxy for the different global operational locations. The markers in the 
data are taken from MIX with the following six regions: “Latin America & The Caribbean,” 
“Africa,” “Middle East & North Africa,” “Eastern Europe & Central Asia,” “South Asia,” and 
“East Asia & The Pacific.” 
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Type: This is a proxy accounting for different types of microfinance institutions.  Again, 
the markers are drawn from MIX with the following six categories of firms: “Non-Government 
Organization (NGO),” “Non-Bank Financial Institution (NBFI),” “Bank,” “Rural Bank,” 
“Cooperative/Credit Union (Coop),” and “Other.” 
Several other indicators were also tested for significance: “Age of Firm,” “Number of 
Staff Members,” and “% of Women Borrowers,” all of which proved to have inconclusive results 
in the ANCOVA model and thus were dropped from the discussion of results.  Of these, only 
Age will be re-introduced in the longitudinal portion of the study, as it shows some significance 
with regard to the cost-size growth relationship. 
 
VII. Results: Analysis of Covariance 
In this section, we will discuss the results of the ANCOVA model.8  As we said above in 
the Methodology section, the overall approach is similar to that undertaken by Cull, et al. (2007), 
with a focus on the operational costs as opposed to the many financial metric.  The results of the 
ANCOVA model are outlined in Table 1 below. 
Right away, we can observe that MFIs in this sample see scale efficiencies.  This can be 
interpreted in several ways.  With regard to overall firm size – or Log GLP in the regression – it 
appears that each percent of growth in Gross Loan Portfolio is correlated with a 0.0626 percent 
reduction in Average Costs.  In other words, bigger firms are associated with smaller average 
costs and therefore better efficiency, the very definition of economies of scale.  This result can be 
extended even more strongly to Average Loan Size, which also has an inverse relationship with 
Average Costs but of a magnitude nearly three times Gross Loan Portfolio. 
 
                                                 
8 Descriptive statistics for all variables can be found in Appendices 2 and 3. 
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Log Average 
Costs
Size
     Log Gross Loan Portfolio ($) -0.0626*
     Log Average Loan Size ($) -0.1838*
Profitability
     Operational Self-Sufficiency (%) -0.3773*
     Return on Assets (%) 0.9460*
Region
     Africa 0.1027*
     East Asia & Pacific 0.0645**
     Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.0441**
     Latin America & Caribbean 0.0687*
     Middle East & North Africa 0.0053
     South Asia -0.2847*
Type
     Bank 0.1184*
     Rural Bank -0.0208*
     Coop/Credit Union -0.1631
     Non-Bank Finanacial Institution 0.0103
     Non-Government Organization 0.0091
     Other 0.0461*
Constant 0.6128*
R2 0.5877
Data Source: 2006 MFI data from Microfinance Information eXchange
* Significant at a .001 level.  ** Significant at .1 level
Table 1:
Regression of Operational Efficiency vs. Firm Attributes
Figures represent an ANCOVA general linear model.  All variables under "Type" and "Region" 
are categorical predictors.  "Profitability" and "Size" are continuous predictors with unit of 
measurement noted.
 
The obvious desire here is to imply causality, namely to state that increasing the size of 
the firm and the size of the average loan both cause the average costs to go down, thus allowing 
the firm to recognize the benefits of efficiency.  There are several concerns: first, as we discussed 
in the prior studies section, there is a delicate balance between the loan size and microfinance 
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efforts to loan to the poor.  On the one hand, the goal is to put the money in the hands of people 
who do not have access to traditional channels of credit, with the underlying theory that these 
people will repay at the same rates.  However, the implication that larger loan size is associated 
with more efficient firms puts the financial and operational goals of the firm at direct odds with 
the social motivation of microfinance (basically, this is the “schism” that Morduch discusses at 
great length).  Moreover, this relationship may be circular, as firms that have scaled up might 
have done so through different channels that are inherently more profitable and by extension 
more efficient.  Thus causality is possible with regard to scale efficiency, but certainly not clear. 
Indeed, our profitability proxies seem to some degree to bear this out.  In terms of self-
sufficiency, MFIs have a very strong relationship between higher self-sufficiency and better 
efficiency.  Again, the causal relationship could point both directions.  Thus taken together with 
the implication that greater size and greater loan size improve efficiency, we begin to see a 
problem with the incentives inherent in the industry.  To put it bluntly, firms managers striving 
for profitability and operational efficiency have incentive to make larger loans and become more 
self-sufficient – and all indications are that this is mainly achievable through lending efforts that 
extend above the “very poor” that the social effort is geared toward. Return on Assets is bit more 
confusing until we remember that the relationship is a semi-log.  Thus a one percent increase in 
return on assets leads to a less than .01 percent increase on average costs, a positive relationship 
but a very small one. 
The final dimensions included in the ANCOVA model are Type and Region.  These will 
be discussed at greater length in our longitudinal model, but we see some trends emerging with 
regard to efficiency.  Looking at Region difference, the most striking results are the extremes, 
Africa on the inefficient end and South Asia on the efficient side.  As the focus of this study is on 
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the existence of scale efficiencies, we will not comment on the explanations for this large spread; 
suffice it to say that this is a major area for future research. 
 
VIII. Results: Scale Efficiency with Growth 
In this section, we outline the results from our longitudinal regression analysis.  We will 
focus on the final two dimensions – Type and Region – as well as how the results relate to the 
ANCOVA model.  Firm Type was further subdivided into “NGO” and all others, as these Non-
Government Organizations occupy a unique place in the microfinance industry, driven by social 
gains but often with an eye toward self-sufficiency and self-sustainability.  The intuition from 
analyzing these firms as a separate entity is also confirmed by the results of Gutierrez-Nieto, et 
al. (2007) which posits that NGO status is one of the principal components driving efficiency.  In 
short, the NGO stands out as different from the rest and thus is examined separately in Table 2. 
 
NGO Non-NGO Overall
'01-'02 0.769 0.987 0.881
'02-'03 0.727 0.800 0.763
'03-'04 0.775 0.731 0.733
'04-'05 0.844 0.706 0.761
'05-'06 0.800 0.773 0.787
'01-'06 0.664 0.784 0.719
Data Source: Microfinance Information eXchange
'01-'06 data is based on a regression of 5-year CAGR of MFIs.
Data in chart represent β1 such that: OC Growth = β0 + β1 * (GLP Growth) + error
All calculations significant at a .001 level.
Table 2:
Growth Relationship by Firm Type
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As outlined above, the overall regression of 5-year growth of average costs versus the 5-
year growth of operational costs shows a gap in efficiency between NGOs and Non-NGOs, with 
NGOs seemingly more efficient as they have scaled by a significant margin.9  However, this 
difference has not been uniform over the past five years.  Whereas the efficiency growth 
relationship has grown slightly for NGOs, the Non-NGOs saw a big shift downward after 2002 
and otherwise similar or even better returns to scale.  Without longer-term data, it is difficult to 
fully explain this trend; we will discuss this at greater length in our concluding remarks.  Overall, 
though, the story is the same is in our ANCOVA regression: MFIs do see operational efficiencies 
as they grow larger. 
The final part of our study looks at the size-cost growth relationship by Region of 
operation.  Again, Gutierrez-Nieto, et al. (2007) guide our intuition, as their results show 
“country clusters” in their PCA analysis with regard to the dimensions/components of size and 
efficiency.  In other words, MFIs within the same region in their study appeared to have similar 
scale efficiencies.  As such, we have outlined the observed 5-year growth relationship by region 
in Table 3 below in an effort to quantify the differences by region. 
Africa
Eastern 
Europe
Latin 
America
Middle 
East
South & 
East Asia
Overall
'01-'06 0.870 0.838 0.857 .451* 0.661* 0.719
Data Source: Microfinance Information eXchange
'01-'06 data is based on a regression of 5-year CAGR of MFIs.
Data in chart represent β1 such that: OC Growth = β0 + β1 * (GLP Growth) + error
All calculations significant at a .001 level, unless otherwise indicated.
* Significant at a .01 level.
Table 3:
Growth Relationship by Region
 
                                                 
9 Recall that in this regression, a value of “1” means that an MFI’s costs have grown in step with its overall 
portfolio.  Anything less than one indicates that the costs have grown slower than the portfolio; or in other words, 
the firm has been able to achieve scale efficiencies as it has grown. 
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The results show that firms in the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia see much 
stronger scale efficiencies than their counterparts in the other three regions.  This result is 
consistent with the results from our ANCOVA model summarized in Table 1, namely that Africa 
sees the fewest scale efficiencies – though still positive – with Latin America and Eastern Europe 
in the same basic realm and South Asia in particular showing strong economies of scale.  These 
results have significant implications for business models in those areas, namely that the Middle 
Eastern and Asian MFIs should be as large as possible while MFIs in the other regions should 
focus on efficiencies in other areas than scale. 
It is important to note that sample size may play a role in the results, as Africa, Eastern 
Europe and Latin America each have a significant number of firms in this sample.  This may get 
back to our original concerns with selection bias, namely that the regions with fewer firms 
reporting to MIX also have the most successful firms reporting to MIX.  Overall, further study of 
major operational difference in these regions is an important area for future research, as the 
implications for scale decisions are clear. 
 
IX. Discussion and Conclusion 
We have examined economies of scale in microfinance institutions in two dimensions – 
by comparing similar firms across a broad sample as well as by looking at firms as they grow – 
and in both cases, we see strong evidence that operational efficiencies and size are positively 
correlated.  In short, a larger MFI appears on average to be a more efficient one.  However, 
converting this result into suggestions for policy is much more complicated. 
Consider the results we saw with NGOs versus non-NGOs, namely that NGOs show 
stronger economies of scale than non-NGOs.  The reality is that there may be several possible 
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underlying themes to this result: first, the difference could be that NGOs are receiving subsidies 
that do not get filed under operating costs.  The role of subsidies in microfinance and specifically 
the Grameen Bank was discussed at length in Morduch (1999b), while the impact of subsidies in 
financial institutions was examined in Wolken and Navratil (1980).  In short, both argue that 
subsidies are a vital part of operations across many financial institutions and that if grants were 
subtracted from profits – or accounted for in operational budgets at the market rate for the 
subsidy – much of the increased return would disappear.  This is not to say that the subsidies are 
bad, merely that they are going toward the non-monetary “social returns” of poverty alleviation.  
The trade-off is that the apparent scale efficiency of those firms receiving the subsidies cannot be 
taken at face value as tradition measures improperly value the firm costs. 
Alternatively, as argued in Krauss and Walter (2006), microfinance institutions show 
some resistance to broader market movements.  But this effect may not be uniform across 
different firm types and thus the market downturn after 2001 impacted the operations of the non-
NGOs more than the NGOs.  This too would have an impact on scale efficiency and deserves 
further study in the context of product diversification. In short, we can see that it is hard to 
simply say that NGOs should implement a growth policy in order to become more efficient. 
Converting the results into policy gets even more complicated when considering that 
efficiency may not be a firm’s primary goal.  Indeed, efficiency and self-sustainability in 
microfinance do not imply “success” since societal improvement is often paramount to the 
venture.  In fact, striking this balance between social and financial gains has become the new 
challenge in the industry, one that has only begun to be evaluated.  Jonathan Morduch envisioned 
many of these issues nearly a decade ago in Morduch (2000) and still his writings resound loudly 
with current struggles: 
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 “Addressing the schism [between rhetoric and action, and between financially-minded donors and 
socially-minded programs] may also mitigate the emerging backlash against the microfinance 
movement. The insistence on the win-win proposition has alienated many potential supporters. 
Those willing to trade off costs for benefits have become frustrated as microfinance institutions 
stretch accounting data in order to claim profitability while simultaneously eschewing social 
evaluations. Perhaps more problematically, those interested in replicating the well-known success 
stories have only had partial and unreliable evaluations on which to base their plans.”10
 
As mentioned earlier in the paper, this debate has recently brimmed over as two of the 
largest players in the microfinance world – the Yunus’ Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, and 
Compartamos in Mexico – have begun openly criticizing each other, as Yunus believes that the 
pressures of seeking profit will cause Compartamos to abandon its social mission.11  This debate 
more than any highlights the importance of a better understanding of the scale efficiency in order 
to inform decision-making for many players, including donors, investors and most importantly 
the managers of the firm. 
On the one hand, this study offers an answer to this question: yes, there are scale 
efficiencies. But the areas in which we see them have very important suggestion for the future of 
the industry.  In essence, bigger portfolios and bigger loans are associated with better efficiency; 
or differently, the firms see economies of scale.  That said, Yunus’ concern with Compartamos’ 
business model may be founded as the act of increasing average loan size may run counter to the 
social design of microfinance.  This leaves managers with a quandary: if organizational leaders 
are pushing for better efficiency and perhaps even profitability, how can this be balanced with 
the social mission?  This question is even stronger for NGOs which currently see very strong 
scale efficiencies but have perhaps an even stronger social mission, if only because the receipt of 
subsidies may be at the root of much of this efficiency and the subsidies are in theory allotted 
almost exclusively for the social goals of the firm. 
                                                 
10 Morduch (2000), p. 627 
11 Malkin (2008) 
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Thus the roadmap to exploiting efficiency in microfinance remains cloudy.  On the 
positive side, a great deal of research is being conducted to address both “best practice” and 
industry-wide issues, much of which speaks loudly about how managers can attempt to balance 
the profit and social aims of the firm.  However, the negative side is that many of these studies – 
Cull, et al. (2007) in particular – show that this balance must stem out of an acceptance that there 
is a trade-off between profit and social mission, and thus the “win-win” proposition of 
microfinance discussed in Morduch (2000) is a mirage.  The results from our study would seem 
to confirm the latter, with the implication that managers who hope to maximize social gains must 
be willing to sacrifice profit in order to do so.  And conversely, any firm that places profit first 
will ultimately find itself moving out of the business of microfinance for social gains and into the 
broader realm of credit loans.  In all, while not confirming a “win-win” solution, results such as 
these should at least allow firms and managers to be more realistic in their operational and 
strategic prioritization. 
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XI. Appendices 
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Appendix 1: Histogram of Operating Expense
 
 
Mean StDev Min Median Max
Efficiency
    Log Average Costs -0.6691 0.2896 -1.6073 -0.7014 0.1961
Size
     Log Gross Loan Portfolio ($) 6.7824 0.7438 4.7306 6.7540 8.9739
     Log Average Loan Size ($) 2.7004 0.5026 1.5441 2.7235 4.4297
Profitability
     Operational Self-Sufficiency (%) 1.1843 0.2795 0.1881 1.1721 2.2702
     Return on Assets (%) 0.0583 0.0695 0.0002 0.0419 0.7788
Data Source: Microfinance Information eXchange
Appendix 2:
Descriptive Stats for Firm Attributes
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N Mean StDev Min Median Max
Region
     Africa 93 -0.530 0.304 -1.604 -0.520 0.196
     East Asia & Pacific 26 -0.421 0.265 -1.014 -0.377 0.180
     Eastern Europe & Central Asia 85 -0.761 0.218 -1.607 -0.718 -0.357
     Latin America & Caribbean 195 -0.676 0.270 -1.309 -0.722 0.124
     Middle East & North Africa 28 -0.691 0.246 -1.369 -0.682 -0.141
     South Asia 44 -0.889 0.271 -1.530 -0.881 0.070
Type
     Bank 34 -0.614 0.321 -1.158 -0.692 0.196
     Rural Bank 10 -0.850 0.243 -1.152 -0.940 -0.447
     Coop/Credit Union 56 -0.862 0.258 -1.607 -0.830 -0.249
     Non-Bank Finanacial Institution 160 -0.693 0.270 -1.604 -0.717 0.180
     Non-Government Organization 197 -0.593 0.277 -1.272 -0.583 0.124
     Other 14 -0.704 0.328 -1.369 -0.682 -0.171
OVERALL 471 -0.669 0.290 -1.607 -0.701 0.196
Data Source: Microfinance Information eXchange
Appendix 3:
Descriptive Stats for Average Costs (by Type and Region)
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been a significant upturn in mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activity in the 
past few years as is typical during high market growth periods.  This upturn follows a few years 
of M&A decline after the hot period in the 1990’s. Non-U.S. companies entered the scene in the 
1980s and their involvement picked up pace in the 1990s. Starting in the mid-1990s, over 15% of 
M&A deals with U.S. acquirers have involved a target company based in a foreign country. 
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There are many reasons why companies choose the path of growing through M&A rather 
than adopting an organic growth model and much research has been devoted to the topic over the 
years. Still, the move toward globalization and the vast expansion of mergers and acquisitions 
involving non-U.S. companies raises a different question: 
 
Are deals between two U.S. companies more successful, less successful or do they 
result in the same level of success as deals between a U.S. company and Non-U.S. 
Company? 
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Taking on the strategy of a cross-border acquisition has many potential implications. A 
cross-border M&A may simply be an attempt at value creation as would any domestic M&A be. 
Still, a cross-border M&A could also offer a way to enter a foreign market whereas a domestic 
M&A may not provide that opportunity. When predicting performance of a cross-border M&A, 
we can consider the possibility of better synergies between two companies due to geographic 
expansion opportunities or sharing of different practices to improve business. Yet, there may be 
negatives such as conflict of management styles and a turbulent integration process due to 
significantly different cultures. 
 
II. PREVIOUS WORK 
 
M&As have been used as a strategy for expansion by companies for some time now and 
much research has been dedicated to analyzing the area. The technological breakthroughs of the 
1990s and the increasing effects of globalization made M&As and especially cross-border 
M&As even more popular. The total value of deals completed between 1998 and 2000 
approached $4 trillion – more than the combined value of deals completed in the prior 30 years 
(Henry, 2002). To date, much of the research has concluded that cross-border M&As may 
not be as successful as acquirers might hope and pose significant challenges in the post-
acquisition stages (Child et al., 2001). Furthermore, a study by KPMG found that over half of 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions destroyed shareholder values, while only 17% created 
shareholder value (Economist, 1999). 
Still, while there has been a significant amount of research devoted to M&As, research on 
cross-border M&As has not kept up with the recent trend of increasing cross-border activity. 
Furthermore, this subtopic does not carry the recognition it deserves warranting research separate 
from (domestic) M&As, in general. The more recent research on cross-border M&As has 
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focused on post-acquisition issues such as integration processes, integration processes from an 
employee viewpoint, post-acquisition turnover of acquired firm executives, post-acquisition 
performance of acquired and acquiring firms, and the resulting knowledge transfer and 
organizational learning (Shimizu et al., 2004).  
Cross-border M&A research originally focused on the concept that a cross-border 
acquisition is done by a firm in a developed country entering a less developed country (Wilson, 
1980). With the current globalization trend blurring this concept, this paper examines empirical 
evidence from more recent cross-border deals (defined as between two companies headquartered 
in different countries) to analyze whether there is still a difference in performance following a 
cross-border deal compared to one that went through a domestic acquisition. The research 
focuses on deals where a U.S.-headquartered company is the acquirer. 
III.  DATA SELECTION 
The most important aspect in comparing the performance of a cross-border acquisition 
with an acquisition involving two U.S. companies is finding a representative sample. The 
primary focus of the analysis is on comparing accounting performance post merger for a matched 
pair sample of deals. Three main sources of data are used to gather the required information: 
Thomson SDC database, CRSP, and Compustat. First, the Thomson SDC deal database is used 
to extract all recorded deals which were effective as of 1990. These deals are then examined to 
produce a data set containing a sample of matching pairs of deals. If Tc represents a control 
transaction and Tm represents a matching transaction, the sample is produced as follows: 
• Acquirors of Tc and Tm are both headquartered in the United States 
• Target of Tc is headquartered in the United States 
• Target of Tm is not headquartered in the United States 
• First 2 SIC digits of acquirer in deal Tc match first 2 SIC digits of acquirer deal Tm 
• First 2 SIC digits of target in deal Tc match first 2 SIC digits of target deal Tm 
• Acquirer owns 100% after transaction in both Tc and Tm 
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• Acquirer in deal Tm has total assets between 50% and 200% of acquirer’s total assets 
in deal Tc 
• Value of transaction in deal Tm is between 50% and 200% of value of transaction in 
deal Tc 
• Deals Tc and Tm occurred within 1 year of each other 
 
This narrows a total of about 372,000 deals down to approximately 2,000 valid pairs. 
This data is then split into three distinct sets: 
1. Neither acquirer from the matched pair was involved in a takeover (either as a target 
or an acquirer) in the fiscal year following the transaction in question. This set will 
subsequently be referred to as “t+1” or “1 year post acquisition” in the analysis. 
2. Neither acquirer from the matched pair was involved in a transaction in the following 
two fiscal years following the transaction in question. This set will subsequently be 
referred to as “t+2” or “2 years post acquisition” in the analysis. 
3. Neither acquirer from the matched pair was involved in a future transaction in the 
following three fiscal years following the transaction in question. This set will 
subsequently be referred to as “t+3” or “3 years post acquisition” in the analysis. 
 
In order to analyze accounting performance, further data is then extracted from 
Compustat Fundamentals for the remaining qualifying pairs. The following accounting ratios are 
used for performance analysis using the data from the Compustat databases: 
• EBIT / ASSETS 
• EBIT / SALES 
• SALES / ASSETS 
• NI / EQUITY 
• (NI + Interest Expense) / ASSETS 
 
Due to some missing information, this reduced the sample sizes further. The final sample 
sizes are depicted in the analysis. 
In the second part of the analysis, I examine abnormal excess returns in the period around 
the announcement of the acquisition for each pair. I use the same samples of matched pairs as 
above to see whether cross-border acquirers see better stock performance around the 
announcement as compared to their domestic deal counterparts. 
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IV.  COMPANY PERFORMANCE 
IV.1 Analyzing Company Performance 
To analyze company performance, I performed two types of analysis on each of the three 
sets described above (t+1, t+2, and t+3). First, the difference in means was analyzed using the 
matching sample t-stat test. Also, cross-section regressions were done to attempt to predict the 
causes for any difference in performance. 
For each accounting ratio R outlined in the previous section, the following differences 
were analyzed for each deal pair j: 
 ∆ Rj = (Rjc-Rjm)t+n - (Rjc-Rjm)t-1 
 
where Rjc is the ratio of the control deal in pair j, Rjm is the ratio of the matching cross-border 
deal in pair j, t is the fiscal year of the deal’s effective date and n is the number of years after the 
deal where the acquirer was not involved in another transaction. This was done as three distinct 
sets for n = 1, 2, and 3 and the results are as follows. 
Performance Differences between Domestic Deals and Cross-Border Matches 
 
  
1-Year Post-Acquisition 
(Sample:202) 
2-Year Post-Acquisition 
(Sample:93) 
3-Year Post-Acquisition 
(Sample:42) 
  Mean Median t stat 
p-
value Mean Median t stat 
p-
value Mean Median t stat 
p-
value 
∆
ASSETS
EBIT  0.00 (0.00) 0.22 0.83 0.05 0.02 1.30 0.20 0.09 (0.01) 1.16 0.25 
∆
SALES
EBIT  1.93 0.00 1.07 0.28 14.47 0.05 1.09 0.28 1.43 0.03 1.33 0.19 
∆
ASSETS
SALES  (0.00) (0.01) (0.08) 0.94 (0.01) (0.01) (0.20) 0.84 (0.13) (0.09) (2.01) 0.05 
∆
EQUITY
NI  0.21 0.01 0.35 0.73 (0.03) 0.08 (0.07) 0.95 (0.44) (0.03) (1.28) 0.21 
∆
ASSETS
IntExpNI )( +  0.01 0.00 0.25 0.81 0.18 0.05 2.74 0.01 0.15 (0.01) 1.61 0.12 
The above data suggests that, while not necessarily significant in a strict sense, there is 
generally a difference in performance of acquirers that went through a cross-border acquisition 
as compared to those involved in a domestic deal. We notice a few visible trends. We see a better 
performance of domestic acquirers in terms of pre-tax margin, which can support the notion that 
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domestic deals may have bigger cost synergies than similar cross-border deals. We also notice 
that domestic acquirers have a better return on assets while the acquirers in cross-border deals 
show a better asset turnover. The ROA trend suggests that it may be easier to integrate a 
domestic company in terms of efficient use of its assets. At the same time, the trend for asset 
turnover may support the common belief that cross-border acquisitions are a good strategy for 
opening new markets for companies’ existing products. 
The next step was to compare the performance of acquirers from cross-border deals to the 
industry performance. Manufacturing, Services, and Mining represented the bulk of the 
industries in the sample set: 
I ndust r y  Composi t i on
M i ni ng
7%
M anuf actur i ng
51%
3%
2%
3%
Ser v i ces
34%
 
Here, I take a similar approach in using the same five ratios as above. However, instead 
of using values of a control deal, I compare the median from the industry (using the first two SIC 
digits) to the cross-border deal. 
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Performance Differences between Cross-Border Deals and Industry 
  
1-Year Post-Acquisition 
(Sample:181) 
2-Year Post-Acquisition 
(Sample:81) 
3-Year Post-Acquisition 
(Sample:41) 
  Mean Median t stat 
p-
value Mean Median t stat 
p-
value Mean Median t stat 
p-
value 
∆
ASSETS
EBIT  0.04 0.01 1.94 0.05 0.04 0.02 1.08 0.29 0.08 0.01 1.19 0.24 
∆
SALES
EBIT  1.77 0.01 0.86 0.39 1.69 0.04 1.11 0.27 1.19 (0.02) 1.31 0.20 
∆
ASSETS
SALES  (0.06) (0.03) (2.29) 0.02 (0.10) (0.04) (2.18) 0.03 (0.21) (0.11) (2.72) 0.01 
∆
EQUITY
NI  0.74 0.03 1.22 0.23 0.20 0.02 0.57 0.57 0.01 (0.03) 0.03 0.98 
∆
ASSETS
IntExpNI )( +  0.08 0.02 2.48 0.01 0.13 0.01 1.94 0.06 0.12 0.01 1.86 0.07 
 
The above results show a similar picture as when comparing cross-border deals to 
matching domestic deals. In general, acquirers of cross-border targets do not perform as well as 
the industry. Here, however, we see a bit more statistical significance in our results. Specifically, 
acquirers following a cross-border acquisition appear to consistently have a higher asset turnover 
than the industry (at the 95% confidence level for first two years post deal and 99% confidence 
level for three years post deal), but at the same time a lower ROA (at the 99% confidence level 
for first year post acquisition and at the 90% confidence level for the following two years) as 
compared to the industry. Once again, similarly to the domestic deal comparison, cross-border 
acquirers lag on their return on assets when compared to the industry. 
IV.2 Predicting Company Performance 
The next piece of the matched-pair analysis involves a cross-section regression. Here, I 
took two different approaches to attempt to explain the differences. First, each ratio described 
above was used as the dependent variable and the following as independent variables: 
• Deal consideration (Dummy variable with 1 for cash only deals and 0 otherwise) 
• LOG of acquirer size 
• LOG of target size 
• Target private/public (Dummy variable with 1 for public 0 for private) 
• Acquirer and target in the same-industry (Dummy variable with 1 for same industry) 
• Acquirer's market value/book value of equity 
• Acquirer in manufacturing industry (dummy variable) 
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• Acquirer in services industry (dummy variable) 
 
The regression was set up for each accounting ratio R as follows: 
∆Rj = Ai * Xij + Bi * Yij + ... 
 
where Xij is a vector of characteristics of control deal j and Yij is a vector of characteristics of 
matching deal j. This regression was performed for the three distinct sets of t+1, t+2, and t+3 
(detailed results can be found in Figure1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 for the three sets respectively 
and are in columns labeled “(1)”), The second approach uses a slight variation in that the 
difference for each ratio at t+n is set as the dependent variable while the difference for each ratio 
at t-1 was added as another independent variable in addition to the characteristics above. 
Specifically, the regression equation for each ratio R was set up as follows: 
∆R(j, t+n) = Ai * Xij + Bi * Yij + C * ∆R(j, t-1) 
 
where Xij is a vector of characteristics of control deal j and Yij is a vector of characteristics of 
matching deal j. This regression was also performed for the three distinct sets of t+1, t+2, and 
t+3 (detailed results can be found in Figure1, Figure 2, and Figure 3 for the three sets 
respectively and are in columns labeled “(2)”). 
A few of the factors appear to be of interest in the results. Looking at (1) regressions, we 
can observe the effect of the public status of the target in the cross-border deal. The negative 
coefficients for cross-border deals and positive coefficients for domestic deals suggest that deals 
which involve target companies that are public will tend to perform better. This is not 
unreasonable as it is likely that much more information is available on public targets. Also, if we 
look at the Market-to-Book ratio for cross-border deals, we can see that acquirers with higher 
Market-to-Book ratios will generally show a slightly worse ROE in the first year following the 
deal, but then trend towards having generally better performance. However, there are no 
coefficients that consistently have a large effect on the difference in performance. Furthermore, 
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when we examine the second set of regressions, labeled with (2), we can see that the 
performance in the year prior to the acquisition has a dominant influence on the performance in 
the subsequent years. In general, these results indicate that that the factors chosen do not have a 
significant impact on the difference in post-acquisition performance between domestic deals and 
their cross-border matches. In fact, the main drivers for the difference is the difference in 
performance of the acquirers’ pre-acquisition performance, which is expected. 
A further analysis of the location of the targets in cross-border deals reveals a similar 
picture. Looking at Figure 4, we can see that while acquirers who purchase a target in developing 
countries do not initially (1 year after deal completion) achieve positive results, they do tend to 
perform better in subsequent years. Still, the dominant factor in predicting post-deal performance 
is once again the acquirers’ performance prior to the acquisition and the location of the target is 
not a statistically significant indicator. 
I also performed similar cross-sectional regressions to attempt to explain the difference in 
cross-border deal performance as compared to the industry medians rather than a matched 
domestic deal. The regression was set up in a similar manner as the matched pair analysis with 
two the approaches. For each ratio difference ∆R (calculated by subtracting the company ratio 
from the industry median), the regressions ware run as follows: 
Model 1:  ∆R = Ai * Xij + ... 
Model 2:  ∆R(j, t+n) = Ai * Xij + C * ∆R(j, t-1) 
 
where Xij is a vector of characteristics of cross-border deal j. Detailed results for Model 1 can be 
found in Figure 5 (for t+1), Figure 7 (for t+2) and Figure 9 (for t+3). For Model 2, the detailed 
results are in Figure 6 (for t+1), Figure 8 (for t+2) and Figure 10 (for t+3). 
Here, we see a few trends that are rather similar to what we observed in the pervious 
analysis. Specifically, we can once again notice that the public status of the target and the 
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Market-to-Book ratio of the acquirer have a noticeable effect on post-acquisition performance. 
Once again, negative coefficients for public targets suggest that cross-border deals with a target 
company that is public will tend to perform better. Similarly, acquirers with higher Mark-to-
Book ratios will show a worse ROE in the first year following the completion of the deal, but 
tend to generally trend better in the two years following. Lastly, Model 2 results once again show 
that pre-acquisition performance is the best indicator for post-deal success of the acquirers. 
V.  STOCK PERFORMANCE 
V.1 Analyzing Stock Performance 
As seen in the previous section, there does not appear to be significant evidence that 
suggests a difference in either direction between the performance of domestic M&A deals and 
their cross-border counterparts. In the second part of the analysis, I examine the market reaction 
around the announcement date for the matched pairs. Specifically, I look at the abnormal excess 
return for acquirers who have announced a domestic acquisition and their matching cross-border 
acquirers. I used the CRSP BXRET variable as the abnormal return measure. In cases when 
BXRET is not available, I calculate the abnormal return with a simple market adjustment by 
subtracting the CRSP value-weighted market index from the stock’s return. 
For this comparison, I use the same three sets of matching pairs of US-only acquirers as 
before. For each pair, I collected the cumulative excess return (CER) for two periods: +/-20 days 
around the announcement and +/-5 days around the announcement. 
We first notice in the graph below1 that over the longer period of twenty days prior to the 
announcement to twenty days following the announcement, the stock market reacts more 
positively to the domestic deal.  
                                                 
1 See Figure 11 for detailed results of the (-20,+20) abnormal returns 
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However, as we examine a shorter period around the announcement, we also notice in the 
chart below2 the cross-border deal shows a significantly larger abnormal return in the period of 
five days before to five days after the announcement as compared to a domestic deal. 
                                                 
2 See Figure 12 for detailed results of the (-5, +5) abnormal returns 
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We can speculate that there is more excitement in the market about a cross-border deal 
than a domestic deal and that the abnormal excess returns are greater for a cross-border deal 
immediately around the announcement. However, the longer period still shows no systematic 
difference in performance of the stocks. 
V.2 Explaining the Difference in Stock Performance 
Given the clear difference in abnormal excess return around the deal announcement 
between acquirers announcing a deal with a domestic target and those looking at a cross-border 
target, I look at another set of cross-section regressions to attempt to explain this difference. The 
regressions are set up using the difference between cumulative abnormal excess return for five 
days around the announcement (from five days before to five days after) as the dependent 
variable. This will help answer the question of whether the market is able to predict the 
subsequence changes in the performance of the acquirers. I once again performed three sets of 
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regressions for the t+1, t+2, and t+3 sets and used two models for each. Both models use the 
same set of firm characteristics as the previous regressions, but add the difference in 
performance as independent variables. Specifically, the first model adds one independent 
variable that is ∆Rj and is defined as: 
∆Rj = (Rjc-Rjm)t+n - (Rjc-Rjm)t-1 
 
where Rjc is the ratio of the control deal in pair j, Rjm is the ratio of the matching deal in pair j, t is 
the fiscal year of the deal’s effective date and n is the number of years after the deal where the 
acquirer was not involved in another transaction. The second model adds the differences before 
the deal and after the deal as two separate variables which are defined as: 
∆R(j,t-1) = (Rjc-Rjm)t-1         and         ∆R(j,t+n) = (Rjc-Rjm)t+n 
Therefore the regression equations are set up as follows: 
Model 1: dCER(-5,+5) = Ai * Xij + Bi * Yij + C * ∆Rj
Model 2: dCER(-5,+5) = Ai * Xij + Bi * Yij + C * ∆R(j,t-1) + D * ∆R(j,t+n) 
 
where Xij is a vector of characteristics of control deal j and Yij is a vector of characteristics of 
matching deal j. Both regressions were performed for the three distinct sets of t+1, t+2, and t+3 
(detailed results can be found in Figure 13, Figure 14, and Figure 15 for the three sets 
respectively with Model 1 results in columns labeled “(1)” and Model 2 results in columns 
labeled “(2)”). 
The results suggest that it is the sizes of the acquirers and targets in the deals examined 
that are the main drivers in explaining the difference in cumulative abnormal excess returns 
around the announcements. We can notice a clear indication that larger acquirers enjoy a higher 
abnormal return. At the same time, we also see that smaller targets have the same effect. When 
looking at the pre-announcement performance as well as future performance of the acquirers, we 
notice that there is no significant effect on the abnormal returns. Therefore, we can speculate that 
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the market does not take acquirers’ pre-deal performance into account and, similarly, does not 
predict subsequent changes in acquirer’s performance. 
VI. SUMMARY 
The trend toward globalization is here. As companies expand, they look for ways to 
expand globally. Answering the question of whether a marriage of a U.S. company and a foreign 
company is better or worse than one of only U.S. companies can give good insight into its value. 
Cross-border M&As are complicated and a great majority is thought to have unsuccessful results. 
There are many variables that must be considered including corporate governance, political 
factors, countries involved, and regulations. To date, it appears that there are differences in both 
post-deal performance of the acquirers and market reaction when comparing cross-border 
acquisitions to similar domestic deals. A cross-border acquisition strategy has many advantages 
to staying close to home and working on a local deal. Yet, there are just as many challenges. 
Today, even domestic deals between large companies (take HP acquiring Compaq) have great 
cross-border implications, and with care, this strategy can lead to ultimate success. As more and 
more cross-border deals are completed, future studies can examine more data and longer time 
periods to further understand the differences between domestic and cross-border deals.
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Figure 1: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to their 
Domestic Matches (1 Year after Completion of Deal) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 0.1887 0.2447* 13.02 16.59 -0.079 0.0746 6.431 6.414 0.2853 0.3536*
(1.36) (1.86) (1.01) (1.28) (-0.38) (0.36) (1.61) (1.62) (1.29) (1.74)
D1 Cash / Other -0.02377 -0.00246 -0.81 -1.288 -0.07305 -0.0108 2.436 2.443 0.02985 0.04488
(-0.45) (-0.05) (-0.17) (-0.27) (-0.92) (-0.14) (1.61) (1.62) (0.36) (0.58)
D1 log(Acquirer Size) -0.1426 -0.0869 -6.47 -6.99 -0.381 -0.3521 3.909 3.795 -0.0964 -0.0136
(-0.90) (-0.58) (-0.44) (-0.48) (-1.59) (-1.52) (0.86) (0.84) (-0.38) (-0.06)
D1 log(Target Size) 0.0313 -0.0649 24.7* 22 0.1871 0.205 1.527 0.76 0.1143 -0.1055
(0.22) (-0.47) (1.85) (1.65) (0.86) (0.98) (0.37) (0.18) (0.50) (-0.49)
D1 Target Public 0.11928** 0.09372* -0.757 0.103 0.11003 0.10863 -1.32 -1.425 0.10292 0.06966
(2.30) (1.90) (-0.16) (0.02) (1.40) (1.44) (-0.89) (-0.96) (1.24) (0.91)
D1 Market-to-Book -0.007755 -0.007503 -0.5072 -0.4638 0.015911* 0.018397**-0.2876* -0.3106* -0.022343** -0.020157**
(-1.32) (-1.35) (-0.93) (-0.86) (1.79) (2.15) (-1.71) (-1.84) (-2.39) (-2.34)
D2 Cash / Other 0.07347 0.07841 -3.117 -1.454 0.10901 0.1226 -1.625 -1.429 0.03183 0.06616
(1.34) (1.51) (-0.61) (-0.28) (1.31) (1.53) (-1.03) (-0.91) (0.36) (0.82)
D2 log(Acquirer Size) 0.0738 -0.0065 1.22 0.49 0.3483 0.2508 -4.095 -3.93 0.0364 -0.0682
(0.50) (-0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (1.57) (1.16) (-0.97) (-0.94) (0.16) (-0.32)
D2 log(Target Size) 0.0382 0.1349 -22.48* -19.76 -0.1494 -0.1343 -2.557 -1.983 -0.0503 0.1445
(0.27) (0.99) (-1.71) (-1.50) (-0.69) (-0.65) (-0.63) (-0.49) (-0.22) (0.68)
D2 Target Public -0.13136** -0.09714* -1.811 -2.965 -0.02222 -0.04326 -1.215 -1.025 -0.14727* -0.10333
(-2.47) (-1.91) (-0.37) (-0.60) (-0.28) (-0.56) (-0.79) (-0.67) (-1.73) (-1.32)
D2 Market-to-Book -0.004181* -0.003316 -0.0702 -0.0635 0.003373 0.001537 0.17026** 0.19779***-0.004266 -0.001311
(-1.69) (-1.41) (-0.31) (-0.28) (0.90) (0.42) (2.40) (2.71) (-1.08) (-0.36)
t-1 Δ --- 0.5823*** --- 0.5897** --- 0.82072***--- -0.2371 --- 0.45528***
--- (6.36) --- (2.77) --- (17.58) --- (-0.30) --- (4.79)
Acuirer Mfg Industry -0.06779 -0.05009 -1.319 -1.871 -0.1135 -0.1455 -4.744** -4.561** -0.067 -0.0425
(-0.93) (-0.73) (-0.20) (-0.28) (-1.03) (-1.36) (-2.27) (-2.18) (-0.58) (-0.40)
Acuirer Svcs Industry -0.03224 -0.02615 3.236 1.782 0.0294 -0.0133 -6.549*** -6.698*** 0.0249 -0.0191
(-0.38) (-0.32) (0.41) (0.22) (0.23) (-0.11) (-2.66) (-2.73) (0.18) (-0.15)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.03979 -0.05002 1.605 1.462 0.0358 0.0256 1.144 1.09 -0.1286 -0.1396
(-0.56) (-0.75) (0.25) (0.22) (0.33) (0.25) (0.56) (0.54) (-1.14) (-1.35)
R-Sq = 9.3% 26.2% 5% 9.2% 9.5% 69.1% 12.0% 13.0% 8.5% 19.6%
R-Sq(adj) = 2.4% 20.1% 0% 1.6% 2.6% 66.6% 5.2% 5.8% 1.5% 12.9%
Degrees of Freedom 13,170 14,169 13,170 14,169 13,170 14,169 13,170 14,169 13,170 14,169
F-Value 1.35 4.28*** 0.69 1.21 1.38 27.01*** 1.78** 1.80** 1.21 2.94***
Δ EBIT / Total Assets Δ EBIT / Sales Δ Sales / Total Assets Δ NI / Equity Δ (NI + Int) / Total 
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This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 1-year post-deal performance of domestic 
deals as compared to cross-border matches. The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios 
depicted at the top of the tables, and the independent variables include various characteristics of the 
companies involved in the deal. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 2: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to their 
Domestic Matches (2 Years after Completion of Deal) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 0.27 0.2711 12.77 13.7 0.2998 0.4003 0.092 1.437 0.3604 0.2869
(0.94) (1.10) (0.96) (1.04) (0.85) (1.02) (0.05) (1.00) (0.95) (1.07)
D1 Cash / Other 0.0063 0.05615 0.349 0.967 -0.0417 -0.0261 0.9488 1.021* 0.0044 0.1072
(0.05) (0.56) (0.06) (0.18) (-0.29) (-0.18) (1.33) (1.76) (0.03) (0.99)
D1 log(Acquirer Size) -0.2723 -0.0881 -6.16 -8.8 -0.4458 -0.5064 2.108 1.001 -0.0373 0.1092
(-0.86) (-0.32) (-0.42) (-0.61) (-1.14) (-1.24) (1.10) (0.64) (-0.09) (0.37)
D1 log(Target Size) 0.5981** 0.2258 25.83* 21.89 0.3497 0.3796 -0.805 -0.585 0.7079* 0.1815
(2.04) (0.88) (1.90) (1.63) (0.97) (1.03) (-0.45) (-0.40) (1.82) (0.66)
D1 Target Public 0.0627 -0.08328 0.739 -0.947 0.1837 0.1777 0.8013 0.3372 0.092 -0.08097
(0.63) (-0.94) (0.16) (-0.21) (1.51) (1.44) (1.34) (0.67) (0.70) (-0.87)
D1 Market-to-Book -0.00204 -0.002424 -0.8697* -0.8954* -0.01161 -0.0107 -0.00969 0.03673 -0.00593 0.002491
(-0.20) (-0.28) (-1.81) (-1.90) (-0.91) (-0.82) (-0.15) (0.72) (-0.43) (0.26)
D2 Cash / Other 0.0904 0.03088 -0.779 0.221 0.1068 0.1169 -0.0553 -0.1962 0.005 -0.0349
(0.80) (0.32) (-0.15) (0.04) (0.77) (0.83) (-0.08) (-0.35) (0.03) (-0.34)
D2 log(Acquirer Size) 0.1178 -0.0451 2.41 4.96 0.1682 0.1864 -1.285 -0.917 -0.1099 -0.1851
(0.40) (-0.18) (0.18) (0.37) (0.46) (0.51) (-0.72) (-0.63) (-0.28) (-0.68)
D2 log(Target Size) -0.4687 -0.1532 -26.04* -21.77 0.002 -0.0054 -0.398 -0.21 -0.5845 -0.1886
(-1.61) (-0.60) (-1.93) (-1.63) (0.01) (-0.01) (-0.23) (-0.15) (-1.51) (-0.70)
D2 Target Public -0.1229 -0.04568 -0.798 -1.292 -0.3415** -0.3396** 0.7045 0.2697 -0.1431 -0.0291
(-1.14) (-0.49) (-0.16) (-0.26) (-2.58) (-2.50) (1.08) (0.50) (-1.00) (-0.29)
D2 Market-to-Book -0.006026 -0.003102 -0.1062 -0.1009 -0.00373 -0.004053 -0.00996 0.00521 -0.008771* -0.002456
(-1.65) (-0.99) (-0.63) (-0.61) (-0.83) (-0.89) (-0.45) (0.28) (-1.81) (-0.71)
t-1 Δ --- 0.1322 --- 0.3215 --- 0.9271*** --- 0.1782 --- 0.1387
--- (0.79) --- (1.06) --- (7.84) --- (0.49) --- (1.35)
Acuirer Mfg Industry -0.0004 0.0678 -0.755 -2.01 -0.0451 -0.058 -0.612 -0.6061 -0.0084 0.0263
(0.00) (0.61) (-0.12) (-0.33) (-0.28) (-0.35) (-0.77) (-0.93) (-0.05) (0.22)
Acuirer Svcs Industry 0.0053 -0.047 5.646 5.139 -0.1517 -0.1804 0.329 -0.8349 0.2028 -0.0226
(0.03) (-0.31) (0.70) (0.64) (-0.71) (-0.81) (0.31) (-0.95) (0.88) (-0.14)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.051 -0.0231 -0.278 -0.762 0.0518 0.0202 -0.8331 -0.544 -0.0696 -0.0403
(-0.35) (-0.19) (-0.04) (-0.12) (0.29) (0.11) (-0.95) (-0.76) (-0.36) (-0.30)
R-Sq = 11.7% 12.2% 17.6% 17.9% 19.6% 62.0% 16.5% 14.5% 15.3% 12.0%
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 0.0% 1.4% 0.0% 3.7% 53.7% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Degrees of Freedom 13,66 14,64 13,66 14,64 13,66 14,64 13,66 14,64 13,66 14,64
F-Value 0.67 0.63 1.08 1.00 1.23 7.46*** 1.01 0.77 0.92 0.62
Δ Sales / Total Assets Δ NI / Equity Δ (NI + Int) / Total 
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This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 2-year post-deal performance of domestic 
deals as compared to cross-border matches. The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios 
depicted at the top of the tables, and the independent variables include various characteristics of the 
companies involved in the deal. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 3: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to their 
Domestic Matches (3 Years after Completion of Deal) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant 0.6984 0.7934 14.37 14.14 -0.8958 -0.5166 -3.552 -3.442 0.9942 0.9407
(0.89) (1.01) (1.23) (1.18) (-1.66) (-0.89) (-0.96) (-0.93) (1.06) (1.27)
D1 Cash / Other -0.2484 -0.229 -1.923 -1.77 -0.4619* -0.2958 0.193 0.198 -0.0999 -0.1281
(-0.69) (-0.64) (-0.36) (-0.32) (-1.87) (-1.12) (0.11) (0.12) (-0.23) (-0.38)
D1 log(Acquirer Size) -0.2966 -0.2638 -16.05 -16.51 -0.7252 -0.8724 1.903 1.138 -1.017 -0.4003
(-0.33) (-0.29) (-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.41) (0.44) (0.26) (-0.93) (-0.45)
D1 log(Target Size) 0.8109 0.6528 13.19 13.75 0.584 0.386 2.721 3.589 1.407 0.7277
(1.15) (0.91) (1.25) (1.26) (1.20) (0.79) (0.81) (1.05) (1.66) (1.05)
D1 Target Public 0.0142 -0.0378 2.601 2.925 -0.1741 -0.0835 -0.09 0.264 0.2252 -0.0429
(0.05) (-0.12) (0.56) (0.61) (-0.82) (-0.39) (-0.06) (0.18) (0.61) (-0.14)
D1 Market-to-Book 0.00672 0.00791 -0.1523 -0.1567 -0.00985 -0.00596 0.0176 0.0075 -0.00446 0.00253
(0.31) (0.36) (-0.46) (-0.47) (-0.65) (-0.40) (0.17) (0.07) (-0.17) (0.12)
D2 Cash / Other -0.194 -0.1516 -0.614 -0.61 -0.38** -0.3571** 1.024 0.878 -0.1366 -0.0669
(-0.85) (-0.66) (-0.18) (-0.17) (-2.41) (-2.33) (0.95) (0.81) (-0.50) (-0.31)
D2 log(Acquirer Size) 0.2524 0.1612 11.81 12.38 1.1955* 1.1572* -0.812 -0.048 0.767 0.1618
(0.29) (0.19) (0.92) (0.94) (2.01) (2.01) (-0.20) (-0.01) (0.74) (0.19)
D2 log(Target Size) -0.9398 -0.7294 -13.02 -13.65 -0.829 -0.5565 -3.581 -4.517 -1.3795 -0.6534
(-1.29) (-0.97) (-1.20) (-1.22) (-1.65) (-1.07) (-1.04) (-1.28) (-1.58) (-0.91)
D2 Target Public -0.0826 0.0131 -3.07 -3.407 -0.4569* -0.3157 -0.413 -0.863 -0.3734 -0.0764
(-0.26) (0.04) (-0.65) (-0.69) (-2.08) (-1.36) (-0.27) (-0.56) (-0.98) (-0.24)
D2 Market-to-Book -0.0161 -0.01285 -0.0452 -0.0624 -0.00079 -0.00201 -0.08995 -0.109 -0.03146 -0.02114
(-0.97) (-0.76) (-0.18) (-0.24) (-0.07) (-0.18) (-1.15) (-1.37) (-1.58) (-1.33)
t-1 Δ --- 0.6341* --- 1.3438 --- 0.8208*** --- 1.8547** --- 0.3724**
--- (1.76) --- (1.57) --- (6.97) --- (2.44) --- (2.11)
Acuirer Mfg Industry -0.0402 -0.0017 -4.48 -4.764 -0.144 -0.1405 1.32 1.045 -0.0758 0.0874
(-0.12) (-0.01) (-0.91) (-0.93) (-0.63) (-0.64) (0.84) (0.66) (-0.19) (0.28)
Acuirer Svcs Industry -0.3552 -0.3424 -3.913 -3.825 -0.416 -0.3202 0.468 0.493 -0.151 -0.1442
(-0.81) (-0.78) (-0.60) (-0.57) (-1.37) (-1.07) (0.22) (0.24) (-0.29) (-0.35)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.0324 -0.149 1.734 2.132 0.8465** 0.6275* 1.6 2.035 0.1264 -0.1858
(-0.07) (-0.30) (0.24) (0.28) (2.51) (1.76) (0.69) (0.87) (0.22) (-0.39)
R-Sq = 24.7% 38.7% 31.0% 34.5% 66.2% 82.4% 31.1% 46.2% 39.4% 46.1%
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 43.1% 68.7% 0.0% 4.4% 0.0% 4.2%
Degrees of Freedom 13,19 14,18 13,19 14,18 13,19 14,18 13,19 14,18 13,19 14,18
F-Value 0.48 0.81 0.66 0.68 2.86 6.02*** 0.66 1.11 0.95 1.10
C
on
tro
l D
ea
l
M
at
ch
in
g 
D
ea
l
Δ (NI + Int) / Total Δ EBIT / Total Assets Δ EBIT / Sales Δ Sales / Total Assets Δ NI / Equity
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 3-year post-deal performance of domestic 
deals as compared to cross-border matches. The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios 
depicted at the top of the tables, and the independent variables include various characteristics of the 
companies involved in the deal. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
 44
Figure 4: Affect of Target Location on Acquirer Performance 
 
1 Year Post 
Deal
2 Year 
Post Deal
3 Year Post 
Deal
Constant 0.01575 0.05533 0.07306
0.75 1.46 1.00
Target in Developing Country 0.7475 -0.0572 -0.085
1.14 (0.51) (0.31)
t-1 Δ 0.51768 0.4171 0.4733
7.20*** 4.03*** 2.69***
R-Sq = 20.9% 15.1% 15.7%
R-Sq(adj) = 20.1% 13.3% 11.4%
Degrees of Freedom 2,199 2,94 2,39
F-Value 26.31*** 8.38*** 3.65**
Δ EBIT / Total Assets (t+k)
 
 
This table shows the influence of target location and acquirer’s pre-deal performance on post-deal 
performance for 1, 2, and 3 years after deal completion for cross-border deals. The dependent variables are 
change in EBIT / Total Assets 1, 2, and 3 years post completion of acquisition. Target location is a dummy 
variable with 1 for targets located in developing countries and 0 otherwise. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 5: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to Industry (1 Year after Completion of Deal: Model 1) 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 0.1961 0.18894** 0.05391 14.38 15.934* 6.519 -0.2125 -0.2141** -0.0975 7.951** 0.386 6.763*** 0.2721 0.2658** 0.053
(1.59) (2.58) (0.66) (1.02) (1.92) (0.71) (-1.34) (-2.30) (-0.94) (2.01) (0.16) (2.62) (1.57) (2.58) (0.46)
Acuirer Mfg Industry -0.05039 --- -0.02143 -3.082 --- -1.589 -0.0333 --- -0.04608 -5.936*** --- -5.556*** -0.03284 --- -0.00437
(-0.76) (-0.33) (-0.41) (-0.22) (-0.39) (-0.56) (-2.78) (-2.70) (-0.35) (-0.05)
Acuirer Svcs Industry 0.02867 --- 0.08535 2.251 --- 4.622 -0.07273 --- -0.05218 -7.64*** --- -6.679*** 0.1193 --- 0.1642
(0.37) (1.17) (0.26) (0.56) (-0.74) (-0.56) (-3.09) (-2.90) (1.11) (1.62)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.01244 --- --- 2.065 --- --- 0.08917 --- --- 1.242 --- --- -0.09646 --- ---
(-0.19) (0.27) (1.05) (0.58) (-1.04)
Cash / Other 0.05676 --- --- -4.041 --- --- -0.03073 --- --- -0.412 --- --- 0.05333 --- ---
(1.20) (-0.75) (-0.51) (-0.27) (0.81)
log(Acquirer Size) -0.05785 -0.03579 --- -4.213 -5.265 --- 0.05152 0.06605* --- -0.758 -0.0788 --- -0.06742 -0.05159 ---
(-1.43) (-1.24) (-0.91) (-1.62) (0.99) (1.80) (-0.58) (-0.08) (-1.19) (-1.28)
log(Target Size) 0.04328 --- -0.00585 -0.784 --- -3.642 0.0096 --- 0.0426 -0.772 --- -1.326 0.05451 --- -0.00752
(0.97) (-0.17) (-0.15) (-0.95) (0.17) (0.98) (-0.54) (-1.23) (0.87) (-0.16)
Target Public -0.11125** -0.11731*** --- -2.001 -3.52 --- -0.07952 -0.06048 --- -1.486 -0.643 --- -0.11633* -0.1435** ---
(-2.33) (-2.68) (-0.37) (-0.71) (-1.30) (-1.08) (-0.97) (-0.45) (-1.74) (-2.33)
Market-to-Book -0.004463** -0.003872* -0.003489* -0.0952 -0.075 -0.0426 0.002577 0.002812 0.00279 0.15453** 0.1437** 0.1711*** -0.00555* -0.004822* -0.00459
(-2.10) (-1.88) (-1.66) (-0.39) (-0.32) (-0.18) (0.95) (1.07) (1.05) (2.27) (2.13) (2.59) (-1.87) (-1.67) (-1.58)
R-Sq = 9.3% 6.5% 4.7% 3.1% 2.0% 2.1% 4.6% 3.5% 2.0% 9.5% 3.3% 8.6% 8.6% 5.3% 5.6%
R-Sq(adj) = 4.4% 4.7% 2.2% 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 1.6% 0.0% 4.7% 1.4% 6.2% 3.7% 3.5% 3.1%
Degrees of Freedom 8,149 3,154 4,153 8,149 3,154 4,153 8,149 3,154 4,153 8,149 3,154 4,153 8,149 3,154 4,153
F-Value 1.9* 3.58** 1.87 0.59 1.05 0.80 0.91 1.87 0.77 1.96* 1.74 3.60*** 1.76* 2.88** 2.26*
1 Year Post Deal Performance
Δ (NI+Int) / ASSETSΔ EBIT / TOTAL ASSETS Δ EBIT / SALES Δ SALES / ASSETS Δ NI / EQUITY
 
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 1-year post-deal performance of cross-border deals as compared to their industry median values. 
The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios depicted at the top of the tables. In this model, the difference is defined as the difference between 
the industry median  and the acquirer’s ratios one year after the deal was completed minus the same difference one year before the deal was completed. The 
independent variables are various characteristics of the companies involved deals. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 6: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to Industry (1 Year after Completion of Deal: Model 2) 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 0.3536*** 0.27017*** 0.09197 18 19.012** 7.598 -0.1768 -0.20962** -0.15933 6.829* -0.462 6.27** 0.4732*** 0.38482*** 0.1177
(3.13) (4.07) (1.23) (1.26) (2.26) (0.83) (-1.21) (-2.42) (-1.63) (1.69) (-0.19) (2.41) (3.07) (4.23) (1.15)
Acuirer Mfg Industry -0.06829 --- -0.02055 -3.257 --- -1.203 -0.0499 --- -0.04223 -5.678*** --- -5.43*** -0.04282 --- 0.00973
(-1.15) (-0.35) (-0.43) (-0.16) (-0.63) (-0.55) (-2.66) (-2.65) (-0.53) (0.12)
Acuirer Svcs Industry -0.02623 --- 0.04362 0.818 --- 4.128 -0.07243 --- -0.02358 -7.165*** --- -6.319*** 0.0344 --- 0.10035
(-0.38) (0.65) (0.09) (0.50) (-0.79) (-0.27) (-2.88) (-2.74) (0.36) (1.10)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.03409 --- --- 2.292 --- --- 0.06919 --- --- 1.165 --- --- -0.10728 --- ---
(-0.58) (0.30) (0.88) (0.55) (-1.32)
Cash / Other 0.04104 --- --- -3.01 --- --- 0.01912 --- --- -0.261 --- --- 0.04601 --- ---
(0.97) (-0.56) (0.34) (-0.17) (0.79)
log(Acquirer Size) -0.11822*** -0.08408*** --- -5.595 -6.357* --- 0.00601 0.06716* --- -0.372 0.3441 --- -0.14258*** -0.11373*** ---
(-3.16) (-3.15) (-1.19) (-1.93) (0.12) (1.97) (-0.28) (0.36) (-2.80) (-3.14)
log(Target Size) 0.04868 --- -0.03661 -0.559 --- -4.293 0.08495 --- 0.08041* -0.746 --- -1.064 0.05443 --- -0.05203
(1.23) (-1.17) (-0.11) (-1.12) (1.55) (1.96) (-0.52) (-0.98) (1.00) (-1.22)
Target Public -0.08344* -0.07506* --- -2.791 -3.881 --- -0.12441** -0.08375 --- -1.622 -0.922 --- -0.08479 -0.08765 ---
(-1.94) (-1.90) (-0.51) (-0.79) (-2.17) (-1.61) (-1.06) (-0.64) (-1.44) (-1.62)
Market-to-Book -0.003155* -0.002677 -0.002015 -0.097 -0.0799 -0.0317 0.000911 0.001927 0.001694 0.11294 0.09154 0.12744* -0.002804 -0.002313 -0.001656
(-1.65) (-1.45) (-1.05) (-0.40) (-0.34) (-0.14) (0.36) (0.79) (0.68) (1.52) (1.25) (1.76) (-1.06) (-0.91) (-0.63)
Δ t - 1 0.40599*** 0.4029*** 0.45807*** 0.6031** 0.5619** 0.6511*** 0.72685*** 0.75222*** 0.74144*** 3.405** 4.066** 3.378** 0.2704** 0.2567** 0.3206***
(4.27) (4.34) (4.94) (2.34) (2.25) (2.61) (13.80) (15.01) (14.48) (1.99) (2.37) (2.06) (2.52) (2.45) (3.03)
R-Sq = 23.2% 21.2% 16.7% 7.7% 7.1% 6.5% 62.1% 60.9% 60.5% 12.7% 7.4% 11.9% 14.8% 12.8% 9.1%
R-Sq(adj) = 18.5% 19.2% 14.0% 2.1% 4.6% 3.4% 59.8% 59.9% 59.2% 7.4% 4.9% 9.0% 9.7% 10.5% 6.1%
Degrees of Freedom 9,148 4,153 5,152 9,148 4,153 5,152 9,148 4,153 5,152 9,148 4,153 5,152 9,148 4,153 5,152
F-Value 4.97*** 10.32*** 6.1*** 1.38 2.91** 2.10* 26.91*** 59.56*** 46.64*** 2.39** 3.04** 4.09*** 2.86*** 5.63*** 3.04**
1 Year Post Deal Performance
Δ (NI+Int) / ASSETSΔ EBIT / TOTAL ASSETS Δ EBIT / SALES Δ SALES / ASSETS Δ NI / EQUITY
 
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 1-year post-deal performance of cross-border deals as compared to their industry median values. 
The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios depicted at the top of the tables. In this model, the difference is defined as the difference between 
the industry median  and the acquirer’s ratios one year after the deal was completed. In addition to the various characteristics of the companies involved in the 
deal, this model includes the difference in the ratios one year prior to the deal completion as an independent variable. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 7: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to Industry (2 Years after Completion of Deal: Model 1) 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 0.2357 0.2191 -0.0265 14.84 14.229**5.122 -0.0106 -0.3872* -0.1437 -0.105 -0.4548 0.3485 0.3281 0.3129* 0.0251
(0.90) (1.43) (-0.18) (1.43) (2.37) (0.89) (-0.03) (-1.87) (-0.74) (-0.07) (-0.50) (0.40) (1.12) (1.82) (0.15)
Acuirer Mfg Industry -0.0413 --- 0.0186 -2.648 --- -0.437 -0.1703 --- -0.1346 0.2786 --- -0.0238 -0.0098 --- 0.0438
(-0.34) (0.16) (-0.54) (-0.10) (-1.06) (-0.90) (0.38) (-0.03) (-0.07) (0.34)
Acuirer Svcs Industry 0.1069 --- 0.1854 1.909 --- 4.668 -0.4789**--- -0.3118* 0.5008 --- -0.2279 0.1719 --- 0.2244
(0.70) (1.39) (0.32) (0.89) (-2.40) (-1.77) (0.55) (-0.29) (1.00) (1.50)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.0388 --- --- -0.089 --- --- 0.1173 --- --- -1.0789 --- --- -0.114 --- ---
(-0.29) (-0.02) (0.68) (-1.36) (-0.76)
Cash / Other 0.07016 --- --- -0.849 --- --- -0.102 --- --- 0.2733 --- --- 0.0716 --- ---
(0.73) (-0.23) (-0.82) (0.48) (0.67)
log(Acquirer Size) -0.1162 -0.04412 --- -5.119 -5.062**--- -0.0381 0.09373 --- 0.5167 0.1675 --- -0.114 -0.06941 ---
(-1.14) (-0.68) (-1.27) (-1.99) (-0.29) (1.07) (0.85) (0.43) (-0.99) (-0.95)
log(Target Size) 0.1157 --- 0.02456 0.274 --- -3.273 0.0995 --- 0.05555 -0.5671 --- -0.2256 0.0804 --- -0.01141
(1.16) (0.35) (0.07) (-1.20) (0.76) (0.60) (-0.95) (-0.54) (0.71) (-0.15)
Target Public -0.11533 -0.1277 --- -1.192 -2.487 --- -0.2373* -0.1012 --- 0.4526 0.1477 --- -0.1019 -0.14467 ---
(-1.19) (-1.53) (-0.31) (-0.76) (-1.88) (-0.90) (0.78) (0.30) (-0.94) (-1.54)
Market-to-Book -0.004574 -0.003251 -0.003153 -0.0419 -0.0332 -0.0058 -0.004073-0.003128 -0.002181-0.01041 -0.01939 -0.01785 -0.006227 -0.005492 -0.005027
(-1.34) (-1.02) (-0.97) (-0.31) (-0.27) (-0.05) (-0.91) (-0.73) (-0.51) (-0.51) (-1.01) (-0.92) (-1.62) (-1.53) (-1.38)
R-Sq = 8.5% 4.7% 0.048 8.2% 6.4% 0.058 12.4% 2.8% 0.066 6.8% 2.0% 0.021 9.9% 6.6% 0.067
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 0.7% 0.0% 0.0% 2.4% 0.005 2.1% 0.0% 0.014 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 2.8% 0.015
Degrees of Freedom 8,68 3,73 4,72 8,68 3,73 4,72 8,68 3,73 4,72 8,68 3,73 4,72 8,68 3,73 4,72
F-Value 0.79 1.19 0.91 0.76 1.63 1.1 1.21 0.70 1.28 0.62 0.50 0.38 0.93 1.73 1.3
2 Year Post Deal Performance
Δ EBIT / TOTAL ASSETS Δ EBIT / SALES Δ SALES / ASSETS Δ NI / EQUITY Δ (NI+Int) / ASSETS
 
 
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 2-year post-deal performance of cross-border deals as compared to their industry median values. 
The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios depicted at the top of the tables. In this model, the difference is defined as the difference between 
the industry median  and the acquirer’s ratios two years after the deal was completed minus the same difference one year before the deal was completed. The 
independent variables are various characteristics of the companies involved deals. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 8: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to Industry (2 Years after Completion of Deal: Model 2) 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 0.444** 0.3764*** 0.0832 17.54 16.57*** 5.114 0.0746 -0.3451* -0.2354 0.346 -0.1271 0.8295 0.4406* 0.393*** 0.1157
(2.06) (3.02) (0.68) (1.66) (2.66) (0.89) (0.23) (-1.77) (-1.27) (0.23) (-0.14) (0.96) (1.84) (2.85) (0.96)
Acuirer Mfg Industry -0.022 --- 0.05094 -2.232 --- 0.045 -0.1864 --- -0.1122 0.2354 --- -0.0462 0.0282 --- 0.0842
(-0.22) (0.54) (-0.46) (0.01) (-1.24) (-0.79) (0.33) (-0.07) (0.25) (-0.07)
Acuirer Svcs Industry 0.0135 --- 0.0941 1.301 --- 4.724 -0.4049** --- -0.2217 0.0453 --- -0.6416 0.0567 --- 0.103
(0.11) (0.85) (0.22) (0.90) (-2.15) (-1.32) (0.05) (-0.82) (0.40) (-0.82)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.0487 --- --- 0.134 --- --- 0.0626 --- --- -0.8685 --- --- -0.1009 --- ---
(-0.45) (0.03) (0.38) (-1.13) (-0.83)
Cash / Other -0.00534 --- --- -1.831 --- --- -0.0403 --- --- 0.0444 --- --- 0.00543 --- ---
(-0.07) (-0.48) (-0.34) (0.08) (0.06)
log(Acquirer Size) -0.17696** -0.14216*** --- -6.714 -6.017** --- -0.1281 0.08049 --- 0.4383 -0.0214 --- -0.1405 -0.13044** ---
(-2.12) (-2.63) (-1.58) (-2.28) (-1.00) (0.97) (0.74) (-0.06) (-1.51) (-2.21)
log(Target Size) 0.04673 --- -0.07268 1.226 --- -3.306 0.2148* --- 0.10372 -0.8156 --- -0.5134 0.01416 --- -0.08697
(0.57) (-1.22) (0.30) (-1.21) (1.68) (1.18) (-1.40) (-1.24) (0.15) (-1.24)
Target Public -0.03286 -0.03809 --- -0.865 -1.812 --- -0.2541** -0.117 --- 0.5961 0.3447 --- -0.03023 -0.05071 ---
(-0.41) (-0.56) (-0.23) (-0.55) (-2.14) (-1.10) (1.07) (0.70) (-0.34) (-0.66)
Market-to-Book -0.001313 -0.000946 -0.000303 -0.0399 -0.0238 -0.0018 -0.005867 -0.003734 -0.003324 0.01504 0.00142 0.00824 -0.001466 -0.00165 -0.000655
(-0.47) (-0.37) (-0.11) (-0.30) (-0.19) (-0.01) (-1.39) (-0.92) (-0.82) (0.68) (0.07) (0.39) (-0.46) (-0.56) (0.39)
Δ t - 1 0.0396 0.0295 0.0819 -1.215 -1.208 -0.041 0.5578*** 0.5759*** 0.5812*** -0.5762 -0.4328 -0.6394 0.0797 0.0792 0.086
(0.25) (0.20) (0.53) (-0.65) (-0.71) (-0.02) (4.07) (4.35) (4.34) (-0.90) (-0.72) (-1.04) (0.53) (0.56) (-1.04)
R-Sq = 11.4% 10.6% 0.052 9.4% 7.7% 0.055 31.6% 23.3% 0.26 7.3% 1.4% 0.034 9.3% 8.3% 0.056
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 5.7% 0 0.0% 2.6% 0 22.5% 19.0% 0.207 0.0% 0.0% 0 0.0% 3.2% 0
Degrees of Freedom 9,67 4,72 5,71 9,67 4,72 5,71 9,67 4,72 5,71 9,67 4,72 5,71 9,67 4,72 5,71
F-Value 0.96 2.14* 0.78 0.77 1.50 0.83 3.45*** 5.46*** 4.98*** 0.59 0.26 0.51 0.77 1.62 0.85
2 Year Post Deal Performance
Δ EBIT / TOTAL ASSETS Δ EBIT / SALES Δ SALES / ASSETS Δ NI / EQUITY Δ (NI+Int) / ASSETS
 
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 2-year post-deal performance of cross-border deals as compared to their industry median values. 
The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios depicted at the top of the tables. In this model, the difference is defined as the difference between 
the industry median  and the acquirer’s ratios two years after the deal was completed. In addition to the various characteristics of the companies involved in the 
deal, this model includes the difference in the ratios one year prior to the deal completion as an independent variable. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 9: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to Industry (3 Years after Completion of Deal: Model 1) 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 0.7131 0.5302* 0.3173 11.253 8.566** 2.507 -1.5074**-0.7131** -0.4696 -1.362 0.622 0.831 1.0466* 0.7972*** 0.4147
(1.25) (1.99) (1.02) (1.35) (2.21) (0.53) (-2.40) (-2.21) (-1.24) (-0.58) (0.56) (0.65) (2.05) (3.37) (1.46)
Acuirer Mfg Industry 0.0522 --- 0.0855 -0.933 --- 0.632 0.0473 --- -0.058 0.16 --- 0.0275 0.0198 --- 0.0887
(0.19) (0.35) (-0.24) (0.17) (0.16) (-0.20) (0.14) (0.03) (0.08) (0.40)
Acuirer Svcs Industry -0.0983 --- -0.0088 -1.133 --- 1.653 -0.2694 --- -0.0087 0.378 --- 0.138 0.0003 --- 0.0929
(-0.32) (-0.03) (-0.25) (0.42) (-0.80) (-0.03) (0.30) (0.13) (0.00) (0.39)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.0671 --- --- 0.605 --- --- 0.9711** --- --- 0.864 --- --- -0.1836 --- ---
(-0.19) (0.12) (2.49) (0.59) (-0.58)
Cash / Other -0.2013 --- --- -2.358 --- --- -0.1441 --- --- 0.8486 --- --- -0.1504 --- ---
(-0.94) (-0.76) (-0.61) (0.97) (-0.79)
log(Acquirer Size) -0.1396 -0.1327 --- -4.286 -2.788* --- 0.3855 0.2398* --- 0.6977 -0.0337 --- -0.2453 -0.20184** ---
(-0.64) (-1.25) (-1.35) (-1.81) (1.61) (1.86) (0.78) (-0.08) (-1.26) (-2.14)
log(Target Size) -0.016 --- -0.1041 1.539 --- -1.59 -0.1025 --- 0.2082 -0.6953 --- -0.2309 0.0264 --- -0.1535
(-0.08) (-0.91) (0.50) (-0.92) (-0.44) (1.48) (-0.81) (-0.48) (0.14) (-1.46)
Target Public -0.0721 -0.0283 --- -3.085 -2.385 --- -0.3859 -0.0969 --- 0.1935 0.0669 --- -0.1117 -0.1311 ---
(-0.32) (-0.16) (-0.94) (-0.95) (-1.56) (-0.46) (0.21) (0.09) (-0.56) (-0.86)
Market-to-Book -0.01733 -0.01552 -0.012362 -0.0833 -0.0148 0.0654 -0.01127 -0.00274 -0.00498 -0.05799 -0.07608* -0.07585* -0.02305**-0.022367**-0.016655
(-1.43) (-1.53) (-1.24) (-0.47) (-0.10) (0.43) (-0.85) (-0.22) (-0.41) (-1.16) (-1.79) (-1.83) (-2.13) (-2.48) (-1.82)
R-Sq = 16.0% 11.5% 10.4% 17.9% 13.8% 5.8% 31.2% 11.7% 9.8% 19.7% 11.5% 12.6% 29.6% 26.2% 20.7%
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 0.0% 4.6% 0.0% 7.2% 2.2% 0.0% 0.0% 2.0% 0.0% 5.1% 18.2% 9.0%
Degrees of Freedom 8,23 3,28 4,27 8,23 3,28 4,27 8,23 3,28 4,27 8,23 3,28 4,27 8,23 3,28 4,27
F-Value 0.55 1.21 0.79 0.63 1.50 0.42 1.30 1.23 0.67 0.70 1.22 0.97 1.21 3.31** 1.76
3 Year Post Deal Performance
Δ EBIT / TOTAL ASSETS Δ EBIT / SALES Δ SALES / ASSETS Δ NI / EQUITY Δ (NI+Int) / ASSETS
 
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 3-year post-deal performance of cross-border deals as compared to their industry median values. 
The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios depicted at the top of the tables. In this model, the difference is defined as the difference between 
the industry median  and the acquirer’s ratios three years after the deal was completed minus the same difference one year before the deal was completed. The 
independent variables are various characteristics of the companies involved deals. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 10: Factors Associated with Performance of Cross-border Deals as Compared to Industry (3 Years after Completion of Deal: Model 2) 
Variable
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
Constant 0.7905 0.4966* 0.3049 10.866 8.222** 2.776 -1.3359** -0.6543* -0.5424 -1.354 0.576 0.836 1.0324* 0.7776*** 0.3948
(1.40) (1.89) (1.00) (1.27) (2.08) (0.58) (-2.08) (-2.04) (-1.45) (-0.56) (0.50) (0.63) (1.98) (3.13) (1.36)
Acuirer Mfg Industry 0.065 --- 0.1127 -1.189 --- -0.039 0.0103 --- -0.0484 0.136 --- 0.024 0.0305 --- 0.1069
(0.25) (0.47) (-0.29) (-0.01) (0.03) (-0.17) (0.12) (0.02) (0.12) (0.47)
Acuirer Svcs Industry -0.0755 --- -0.0576 -1.052 --- 1.633 -0.2282 --- 0.0658 0.293 --- 0.123 -0.0062 --- 0.0677
(-0.25) (-0.22) (-0.23) (0.41) (-0.68) (0.21) (0.21) (0.10) (-0.02) (0.27)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.2264 --- --- 0.641 --- --- 0.8958** --- --- 0.867 --- --- -0.1968 --- ---
(-0.62) (0.12) (2.29) (0.58) (-0.61)
Cash / Other -0.1465 --- --- -2.146 --- --- -0.106 --- --- 0.8591 --- --- -0.1419 --- ---
(-0.69) (-0.67) (-0.45) (0.96) (-0.72)
log(Acquirer Size) -0.1858 -0.1563 --- -4.001 -2.6 --- 0.2689 0.2204* --- 0.6993 -0.0333 --- -0.2468 -0.19992** ---
(-0.86) (-1.48) (-1.21) (-1.63) (1.04) (1.72) (0.77) (-0.07) (-1.25) (-2.08)
log(Target Size) -0.0035 --- -0.1241 1.355 --- -1.593 0.0137 --- 0.2333 -0.7091 --- -0.2325 0.0308 --- -0.1486
(-0.02) (-1.09) (0.43) (-0.91) (0.05) (1.69) (-0.80) (-0.48) (0.16) (-1.39)
Target Public 0.0782 0.0721 --- -3.186 -2.729 --- -0.4189 -0.1468 --- 0.2365 0.1232 --- -0.0923 -0.1112 ---
(0.32) (0.39) (-0.95) (-1.05) (-1.69) (-0.70) (0.24) (0.15) (-0.43) (-0.66)
Market-to-Book -0.01024 -0.01097 -0.0089 -0.0919 -0.0324 0.0411 -0.01211 -0.00257 -0.0037 -0.0513 -0.07018 -0.07496 -0.02159* -0.021258** -0.015115
(-0.79) (-1.04) (-0.88) (-0.51) (-0.21) (0.26) (-0.91) (-0.21) (-0.31) (-0.82) (-1.30) (-1.46) (-1.81) (-2.16) (-1.55)
Δ t - 1 0.1649 0.2821 0.2802 1.555 1.722 2.008 0.7002** 0.6829*** 0.6156** 0.752 0.788 0.963 0.8609* 0.885** 0.7894*
(0.27) (0.54) (0.55) (1.12) (1.44) (1.56) (2.72) (2.86) (2.53) (0.56) (0.68) (0.77) (2.00) (2.43) (1.97)
R-Sq = 19.0% 13.4% 12.9% 23.6% 20.3% 13.7% 45.2% 29.9% 29.8% 16.6% 8.2% 9.2% 33.1% 29.8% 25.1%
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0% 8.5% 0.0% 22.8% 19.5% 16.3% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.7% 19.4% 10.7%
Degrees of Freedom 9,22 4,27 5,26 9,22 4,27 5,26 9,22 4,27 5,26 9,22 4,27 5,26 9,22 4,27 5,26
F-Value 0.57 1.04 0.77 0.75 1.72 0.82 2.02* 2.88** 2.21* 0.49 0.60 0.53 1.21 2.86** 1.74
3 Year Post Deal Performance
Δ EBIT / TOTAL ASSETS Δ EBIT / SALES Δ SALES / ASSETS Δ NI / EQUITY Δ (NI+Int) / ASSETS
 
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in 3-year post-deal performance of cross-border deals as compared to their industry median values. 
The dependent variables are the difference in accounting ratios depicted at the top of the tables. In this model, the difference is defined as the difference between 
the industry median  and the acquirer’s ratios three years after the deal was completed. In addition to the various characteristics of the companies involved in the 
deal, this model includes the difference in the ratios one year prior to the deal completion as an independent variable. t-values for the coefficients are in brackets. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 11: Difference in Means (CER -20,+20) 
Δ sdev t-stat p-value 
0.06% 0.07 0.11 0.91 
1.04% 0.10 1.44 0.15 
1.71% 0.12 2.00 0.05 
2.16% 0.13 2.28 0.02 
2.46% 0.14 2.41 0.02 
2.00% 0.15 1.78 0.08 
2.58% 0.16 2.13 0.03 
2.92% 0.17 2.27 0.02 
3.45% 0.19 2.50 0.01 
3.65% 0.20 2.51 0.01 
4.52% 0.21 2.97 0.00 
4.89% 0.23 2.91 0.00 
4.47% 0.23 2.62 0.01 
4.66% 0.24 2.59 0.01 
4.69% 0.24 2.65 0.01 
4.97% 0.24 2.86 0.00 
4.28% 0.24 2.41 0.02 
3.27% 0.26 1.71 0.09 
2.71% 0.27 1.36 0.17 
2.28% 0.28 1.12 0.26 
2.97% 0.29 1.41 0.16 
0.93% 0.31 0.41 0.69 
1.79% 0.32 0.76 0.45 
1.81% 0.32 0.76 0.45 
1.86% 0.33 0.76 0.45 
2.02% 0.33 0.81 0.42 
1.94% 0.34 0.78 0.44 
1.95% 0.35 0.75 0.45 
1.36% 0.36 0.51 0.61 
1.51% 0.35 0.58 0.56 
1.09% 0.35 0.42 0.67 
0.88% 0.34 0.35 0.73 
0.75% 0.35 0.29 0.77 
0.40% 0.35 0.15 0.88 
0.71% 0.35 0.27 0.79 
0.53% 0.36 0.20 0.84 
0.90% 0.37 0.33 0.74 
1.29% 0.37 0.47 0.64 
1.32% 0.37 0.48 0.63 
1.60% 0.38 0.57 0.57 
1.90% 0.39 0.66 0.51 
 
This table shows the difference between the means of cumulative abnormal excess returns of acquirers 
involved in domestic deals and acquirers involved in cross-border deals. The cumulative excess returns are 
calculated starting 20 days prior to the deal announcement until 20 days after the deal was announced. 
 
 
 
Figure 12: Difference in Means (-5, +5) 
Δ sdev t-stat p-value 
0.19% 0.07 0.38 0.70 
-0.52% 0.10 (0.73) 0.46 
-1.55% 0.12 (1.74) 0.08 
-2.14% 0.12 (2.37) 0.02 
-2.61% 0.13 (2.75) 0.01 
-1.83% 0.15 (1.66) 0.10 
-3.67% 0.19 (2.66) 0.01 
-2.87% 0.20 (2.00) 0.05 
-2.88% 0.19 (2.01) 0.05 
-2.82% 0.20 (1.91) 0.06 
-2.76% 0.21 (1.79) 0.08 
 
This table shows the difference between the means of cumulative abnormal excess returns of acquirers 
involved in domestic deals and acquirers involved in cross-border deals. The cumulative excess returns are 
calculated starting 5 days prior to the deal announcement until 5 days after the deal was announced. 
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Figure 13: Factors Associated with Cumulative Abnormal Excess Returns (1 Year Accounting Data) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -0.01502 -0.01977 -0.003 -0.00281 -0.01012 -0.03015 -0.00078 -0.00175 -0.0159 -0.01023
(-0.16) (-0.20) (-0.03) (-0.03) (-0.11) (-0.31) (-0.01) (-0.02) (-0.16) (-0.11)
D1 Cash / Other -0.03678 -0.03886 -0.03781 -0.03772 -0.03723 -0.04664 -0.03444 -0.03347 -0.03768 -0.0357
(-1.04) (-1.09) (-1.07) (-1.07) (-1.05) (-1.30) (-0.97) (-0.94) (-1.07) (-1.01)
D1 log(Acquirer Size) 0.2281** 0.2255** 0.2192** 0.2188** 0.2221** 0.2197** 0.2248** 0.2243** 0.2277** 0.2295**
(2.08) (2.05) (2.02) (2.00) (2.03) (2.01) (2.07) (2.06) (2.08) (2.09)
D1 log(Target Size) -0.12546 -0.1195 -0.1177 -0.1182 -0.1271 -0.1393 -0.125 -0.1363 -0.12708 -0.1377
(-1.26) (-1.18) (-1.17) (-1.17) (-1.26) (-1.38) (-1.25) (-1.36) (-1.27) (-1.36)
D1 Target Public 0.00779 0.00997 0.01022 0.01005 0.01014 0.00986 0.00867 0.00633 0.00826 0.00609
(0.22) (0.27) (0.29) (0.28) (0.28) (0.28) (0.24) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17)
D1 Market-to-Book -0.001221 -0.001287 -0.001682 -0.001682-0.001472 -0.002256 -0.001694 -0.001923 -0.001174 -0.001116
(-0.30) (-0.32) (-0.42) (-0.42) (-0.37) (-0.56) (-0.42) (-0.48) (-0.29) (-0.27)
D2 Cash / Other 0.02944 0.02965 0.02983 0.0299 0.03074 0.02874 0.02864 0.03006 0.03024 0.03116
(0.79) (0.80) (0.81) (0.81) (0.83) (0.77) (0.77) (0.81) (0.82) (0.84)
D2 log(Acquirer Size) -0.2108** -0.2053** -0.2058** -0.2055**-0.2061** -0.193* -0.2097** -0.2084** -0.2101** -0.2143**
(-2.08) (-2.01) (-2.04) (-2.03) (-2.03) (-1.90) (-2.08) (-2.07) (-2.08) (-2.11)
D2 log(Target Size) 0.12853 0.1204 0.1224 0.123 0.1311 0.13569 0.12841 0.13737 0.12998 0.1415
(1.30) (1.19) (1.23) (1.22) (1.32) (1.37) (1.30) (1.38) (1.31) (1.41)
D2 Target Public -0.0044 -0.00623 -0.00729 -0.00738 -0.00621 -0.00308 -0.00735 -0.00485 -0.0045 -0.00306
(-0.12) (-0.17) (-0.20) (-0.20) (-0.17) (-0.08) (-0.20) (-0.13) (-0.12) (-0.08)
D2 Market-to-Book -0.001935 -0.001951 -0.002043 -0.002041-0.002015 -0.00173 -0.001848 -0.001369 -0.00194 -0.001832
(-1.18) (-1.18) (-1.25) (-1.25) (-1.23) (-1.05) (-1.12) (-0.80) (-1.18) (-1.11)
Acuirer Mfg Industry 0.0228 0.0218 0.01957 0.01947 0.0204 0.02785 0.01375 0.01629 0.02223 0.02304
(0.44) (0.42) (0.38) (0.38) (0.40) (0.54) (0.26) (0.31) (0.43) (0.45)
Acuirer Svcs Industry 0.03673 0.03638 0.03761 0.03751 0.03693 0.04418 0.02866 0.02415 0.03567 0.03376
(0.62) (0.61) (0.64) (0.63) (0.62) (0.74) (0.47) (0.40) (0.60) (0.57)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.06911 -0.06812 -0.06927 -0.06933 -0.07 -0.06843 -0.06871 -0.06894 -0.06809 -0.07017
(-1.46) (-1.43) (-1.47) (-1.46) (-1.48) (-1.45) (-1.45) (-1.46) (-1.43) (-1.47)
Δ Ratio 0.02303 --- -0.0003912 --- -0.00069 --- -0.001115 --- 0.01577 ---
(0.41) (-0.72) (-0.02) (-0.61) (0.44)
Δ t + 1 --- 0.03182 --- -0.000393--- 0.0117 --- -0.001376 --- 0.00423
(0.53) (-0.72) (0.32) (-0.75) (0.11)
Δ t - 1 --- 0.00366 --- 0.000254 --- 0.01799 --- -0.01952 --- -0.03875
(0.05) (0.08) (0.48) (-1.03) (-0.78)
R-Sq = 7.2% 7.3% 7.4% 7.4% 7.1% 8.1% 7.3% 8.0% 7.2% 7.5%
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Degrees of Freedom 14,152 15,151 14,152 15,151 14,152 15,151 14,152 15,151 14,152 15,151
F-Value 0.84 0.79 0.87 0.80 0.83 0.89 0.85 0.88 0.84 0.81
Δ (NI + Int) / Total Δ EBIT / Total Assets Δ EBIT / Sales Δ Sales / Total Assets Δ NI / Equity
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This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in cumulative abnormal excess returns of 
domestic deals as compared to their cross-border deals matches. The dependent variable is the difference in 
cumulative excess returns and the independent variables include a set of characteristics for both deals as 
well as the difference in accounting ratios. The variables labeled as Δ Ratio, Δ t + 1, and Δ t – 1 represent 
the difference in the ratios labeled in the top row with Δ Ratio being the difference at t+1 subtracted from t-
1 and Δ t+1 being the difference a year after the deal while Δ t-1 being the difference a year before the deal. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level.
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Figure 14: Factors Associated with Cumulative Abnormal Excess Returns (2 Year Accounting Data) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -0.0714 -0.0248 -0.0837 -0.0747 -0.1467 -0.0405 -0.0951 -0.0974 -0.0824 -0.033
(-0.35) (-0.13) (-0.40) (-0.35) (-0.75) (-0.19) (-0.46) (-0.48) (-0.40) (-0.17)
D1 Cash / Other -0.11395 -0.07582 -0.11751 -0.11613 -0.10154 -0.09095 -0.12102 -0.09539 -0.11701 -0.06398
(-1.40) (-0.96) (-1.44) (-1.41) (-1.31) (-1.17) (-1.47) (-1.16) (-1.43) (-0.79)
D1 log(Acquirer Size) 0.2396 0.2801 0.2532 0.2415 0.3585 0.2833 0.2502 0.2434 0.2565 0.3107
(1.03) (1.26) (1.09) (1.02) (1.61) (1.23) (1.08) (1.06) (1.11) (1.40)
D1 log(Target Size) -0.2074 -0.2881 -0.2331 -0.2417 -0.28 -0.2392 -0.2411 -0.3017 -0.232 -0.2791
(-0.98) (-1.41) (-1.09) (-1.11) (-1.43) (-1.21) (-1.17) (-1.46) (-1.10) (-1.38)
D1 Target Public -0.05439 -0.11603 -0.06624 -0.07134 -0.09935 -0.10391 -0.06932 -0.09909 -0.06372 -0.10184
(-0.73) (-1.54) (-0.91) (-0.96) (-1.42) (-1.49) (-0.95) (-1.34) (-0.87) (-1.42)
D1 Market-to-Book -0.007869 -0.008052 -0.00818 -0.008329-0.005926 -0.005062 -0.007957 -0.006923 -0.007991 -0.005994
(-1.13) (-1.21) (-1.14) (-1.15) (-0.89) (-0.76) (-1.14) (-1.00) (-1.14) (-0.89)
D2 Cash / Other 0.08218 0.07892 0.07186 0.07476 0.06142 0.06992 0.07387 0.06876 0.07281 0.07278
(1.07) (1.07) (0.94) (0.97) (0.85) (0.97) (0.97) (0.91) (0.96) (1.00)
D2 log(Acquirer Size) -0.1438 -0.2002 -0.1512 -0.142 -0.2045 -0.1746 -0.1486 -0.132 -0.1552 -0.2033
(-0.67) (-0.97) (-0.70) (-0.65) (-1.00) (-0.85) (-0.69) (-0.62) (-0.72) (-0.99)
D2 log(Target Size) 0.1918 0.2696 0.213 0.2235 0.2005 0.1883 0.226 0.2624 0.2136 0.2234
(0.87) (1.27) (0.94) (0.97) (0.98) (0.92) (1.05) (1.23) (0.97) (1.06)
D2 Target Public 0.06296 0.07372 0.06781 0.06515 0.13173* 0.12813 0.06739 0.06913 0.06702 0.07825
(0.81) (0.99) (0.87) (0.83) (1.69) (1.65) (0.87) (0.90) (0.86) (1.05)
D2 Market-to-Book -0.001234 -0.000925 -0.000882 -0.000879-0.000257 -0.000696 -0.000817 0.000521 -0.000994 -0.000397
(-0.51) (-0.40) (-0.37) (-0.37) (-0.11) (-0.31) (-0.34) (0.21) (-0.41) (-0.17)
Acuirer Mfg Industry 0.02932 0.05133 0.0343 0.02905 0.04376 0.03042 0.03687 0.04991 0.03311 0.02617
(0.30) (0.55) (0.35) (0.29) (0.48) (0.33) (0.38) (0.52) (0.34) (0.28)
Acuirer Svcs Industry 0.1572 0.1175 0.156 0.1534 0.1912 0.1614 0.1557 0.1258 0.1577 0.1011
(1.30) (1.01) (1.28) (1.25) (1.66) (1.38) (1.28) (1.04) (1.29) (0.85)
Acq/Target Same Industry -0.1638 -0.15215 -0.1556 -0.1574 -0.17447* -0.20945**-0.1513 -0.1479 -0.1575 -0.16091
(-1.61) (-1.56) (-1.53) (-1.53) (-1.81) (-2.10) (-1.47) (-1.46) (-1.55) (-1.66)
Δ Ratio -0.06561 --- -0.00033 --- 0.16067** --- 0.0056 --- -0.01658 ---
(-0.75) (-0.19) (2.45) (0.33) (-0.27)
Δ t + 2 --- -0.2304** --- -0.000502--- 0.15295** --- -0.00445 --- -0.19681**
(-2.13) (-0.28) (2.34) (-0.25) (-2.09)
Δ t - 1 --- -0.1739 --- -0.001231--- -0.23386**--- -0.0797 --- -0.08512
(-1.34) (-0.27) (-2.67) (-1.62) (-1.18)
R-Sq = 19.3% 27.7% 18.4% 18.6% 27.1% 29.4% 18.5% 22.6% 18.5% 27.5%
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 5.6% 0.0% 0.0% 6.7% 7.7% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.3%
Degrees of Freedom 14,50 15,49 14,50 15,49 14,50 15,49 14,50 15,49 14,50 15,49
F-Value 0.85 1.25 0.81 0.75 1.33 1.36 0.81 0.95 0.81 1.24
Δ EBIT / Total Assets Δ EBIT / Sales Δ Sales / Total Assets Δ NI / Equity Δ (NI + Int) / Total 
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This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in cumulative abnormal excess returns of 
domestic deals as compared to their cross-border deals matches. The dependent variable is the difference in 
cumulative excess returns and the independent variables include a set of characteristics for both deals as 
well as the difference in accounting ratios. The variables labeled as Δ Ratio, Δ t + 2, and Δ t – 1 represent 
the difference in the ratios labeled in the top row with Δ Ratio being the difference at t+2 subtracted from t-
1 and Δ t+2 being the difference a two years after the deal while Δ t-1 being the difference a year before the 
deal. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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Figure 15: Factors Associated with Cumulative Abnormal Excess Returns (3 Year Accounting Data) 
(1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2)
Constant -0.1479 -0.2535 -0.2912 -0.2886 -0.2747 -0.2482 -0.3222 -0.3278 -0.1775 -0.1541
(-0.53) (-0.76) (-1.11) (-1.06) (-0.78) (-0.67) (-1.33) (-1.30) (-0.64) (-0.46)
D1 Cash / Other 0.0969 0.0972 0.0888 0.0828 0.0677 0.0767 0.0998 0.1028 0.1004 0.1022
(0.81) (0.80) (0.79) (0.70) (0.47) (0.51) (0.95) (0.95) (0.82) (0.80)
D1 log(Acquirer Size) 0.0027 0.0868 0.4393 0.5433 0.0449 -0.0913 0.2331 0.1688 0.0524 0.018
(0.01) (0.17) (1.00) (0.91) (0.09) (-0.16) (0.65) (0.41) (0.09) (0.03)
D1 log(Target Size) -0.3374 -0.3186 -0.5685* -0.6396 -0.3248 -0.2997 -0.3661 -0.321 -0.3542 -0.3465
(-1.15) (-1.06) (-2.01) (-1.63) (-0.95) (-0.84) (-1.55) (-1.15) (-1.03) (-0.96)
D1 Target Public -0.0755 -0.0795 -0.1522 -0.1738 -0.1053 -0.0912 -0.10469 -0.0895 -0.0889 -0.0851
(-0.62) (-0.64) (-1.41) (-1.27) (-0.97) (-0.78) (-1.10) (-0.83) (-0.66) (-0.60)
D1 Market-to-Book 0.00113 -0.00059 -0.001168 -0.001574-0.000724 0.000234 -0.000491 -0.000285 0.000164 0.000557
(0.14) (-0.07) (-0.17) (-0.21) (-0.10) (0.03) (-0.08) (-0.04) (0.02) (0.06)
D2 Cash / Other -0.04398 -0.05191 -0.03918 -0.03931 -0.05425 -0.05555 0.00023 -0.00188 -0.03966 -0.03759
(-0.59) (-0.67) (-0.56) (-0.54) (-0.64) (-0.64) (0.00) (-0.03) (-0.53) (-0.48)
D2 log(Acquirer Size) 0.1372 0.0807 -0.2598 -0.3636 0.1342 0.2506 -0.0464 0.0188 0.0837 0.1111
(0.29) (0.17) (-0.62) (-0.63) (0.25) (0.41) (-0.13) (0.05) (0.15) (0.18)
D2 log(Target Size) 0.2129 0.1902 0.4821 0.5645 0.1994 0.1867 0.2371 0.185 0.251 0.2439
(0.63) (0.55) (1.57) (1.28) (0.49) (0.44) (0.91) (0.60) (0.67) (0.62)
D2 Target Public -0.0341 -0.05 0.0071 0.0212 -0.0571 -0.0678 -0.0383 -0.05 -0.0311 -0.0318
(-0.29) (-0.40) (0.06) (0.17) (-0.37) (-0.42) (-0.37) (-0.45) (-0.25) (-0.24)
D2 Market-to-Book -0.008026 -0.007816 -0.00749 -0.007357-0.006826 -0.00687 -0.0097* -0.00999* -0.007825 -0.008144
(-1.43) (-1.36) (-1.44) (-1.36) (-1.18) (-1.15) (-1.96) (-1.92) (-1.34) (-1.26)
Acuirer Mfg Industry 0.0411 0.0483 0.0642 0.0634 0.0549 0.059 0.0815 0.0822 0.0452 0.0471
(0.35) (0.40) (0.58) (0.55) (0.45) (0.47) (0.79) (0.77) (0.38) (0.38)
Acuirer Svcs Industry 0.0409 0.0689 0.0922 0.0947 0.0403 0.0309 0.0834 0.0837 0.0593 0.057
(0.28) (0.45) (0.69) (0.68) (0.26) (0.19) (0.68) (0.66) (0.42) (0.39)
Acq/Target Same Industry 0.0223 0.0714 -0.0061 -0.0269 0.0786 0.0738 0.0644 0.0801 0.0292 0.0209
(0.14) (0.40) (-0.04) (-0.16) (0.35) (0.32) (0.46) (0.53) (0.18) (0.12)
Δ Ratio -0.0827 --- 0.007055 --- -0.051 --- -0.03075* --- -0.02064 ---
(-0.53) (1.37) (-0.36) (-2.06) (-0.21)
Δ t + 3 --- 0.0207 --- 0.008036 --- -0.0933 --- -0.03128* --- -0.0472
(0.09) (1.25) (-0.53) (-2.01) (-0.22)
Δ t - 1 --- 0.0989 --- -0.01576 --- 0.0478 --- 0.05003 --- 0.0252
(0.61) (-0.49) (0.32) (0.84) (0.24)
R-Sq = 51.1% 52.6% 56.3% 56.6% 50.5% 51.3% 62.3% 62.7% 50.2% 50.3%
R-Sq(adj) = 0.0% 0.0% 9.3% 2.4% 0.0% 0.0% 21.7% 16.0% 0.0% 0.0%
Degrees of Freedom 14,13 15,12 14,13 15,12 14,13 15,12 14,13 15,12 14,13 15,12
F-Value 0.97 0.89 1.20 1.04 0.95 0.84 1.54 1.34 0.94 0.81
Δ (NI + Int) / Total Δ EBIT / Total Assets Δ EBIT / Sales Δ Sales / Total Assets Δ NI / Equity
C
on
tro
l D
ea
l
M
at
ch
in
g 
D
ea
l
 
This table shows the influence of factors on the difference in cumulative abnormal excess returns of 
domestic deals as compared to their cross-border deals matches. The dependent variable is the difference in 
cumulative excess returns and the independent variables include a set of characteristics for both deals as 
well as the difference in accounting ratios. The variables labeled as Δ Ratio, Δ t + 3, and Δ t – 1 represent 
the difference in the ratios labeled in the top row with Δ Ratio being the difference at t+3 subtracted from t-
1 and Δ t+3 being the difference a three years after the deal while Δ t-1 being the difference a year before 
the deal. 
***Statistically significant at the 1% level. 
**Statistically significant at the 5% level. 
*Statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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